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BACK TO BASICS:
DETERMINING A CHILD'S HABITUAL
RESIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE HAGUE
CONVENTION
Tai Vivatvaraphol*
Since 1980, the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (Child Abduction Convention) has been ratified by eighty-
one countries, including the United States. The Child Abduction
Convention addresses the growing problem of child abductions by
estranged parents across international borders and the diverse methods
that different countries have developed for dealing with this problem. It
provides for a simple summary-return mechanism to be administered by the
courts of member states: a wrongfully removed (or retained) child is to be
returned to (or permitted to stay in) his or her country of "habitual
residence. " However, the Child Abduction Convention does not define the
term "habitual residence, " and so courts worldwide have been forced to
shape their own standards. In the United States, a rough divide stands
between those federal circuit courts that emphasize the parents' last shared
subjective intentions in determining "habitual residence" and those that
focus on objective indicators of a child's acclimatization. This Note argues
in favor of an objective approach because it best accomplishes the Child
Abduction Convention's aim of instituting a globally uniform and efficient
process for resolving international child abduction disputes.
INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2007, Janea Sorenson made what would likely be one of the
most important decisions of her life-rather than return to the United States
with her estranged husband, Eric, Janea decided to remain in Australia with
their five-year-old daughter, E. S. S.1 Although Janea's decision that day
brought Sorenson v. Sorenson2 before the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota for proceedings under the Hague Convention on the
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Georgetown
University. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Lee for his invaluable guidance and
feedback throughout this process, my friends for their constant support, and my parents and
Hansel for their love and encouragement.
1. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 (D. Minn. 2008).
2. 563 F. Supp. 2d 961.
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Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Child Abduction
Convention),3 the events leading up to Janea's alleged wrongful retention of
E. S. S. actually began four years earlier.
In November 2003, Eric accepted a new job that required him to be
reassigned to Australia.4 The Sorensons sold their house and cars in
Minnesota, packed up their remaining belongings to be shipped or stored
with family, and, in February 2004, landed in Sydney with their daughter
E. S. S., who was then fourteen months old.5 Eric and Janea's already
strained marriage deteriorated further upon their move to Australia and they
separated in March 2005.6 By May 2007, with the expiration of their three-
year visas looming, Eric and Janea exchanged emails about flights back to
the United States. 7 However, after Eric served Janea with a copy of a
petition for the dissolution of their marriage he had filed in Minnesota state
court, she announced that she would be staying in Australia and began
working to obtain new visas for herself and E. S. S. 8
When the family's visas expired on June 2, 2007, Janea retained E. S. S.
in Australia against Eric's wishes. 9  Eric delayed his departure from
Australia and attempted to convince Janea to reconsider; when that failed,
he returned to the United States without E. S. S.l0 Eric then submitted an
Application for Return of Child under the Child Abduction Convention to
the U.S. Central Authority.11  When the Australian Central Authority
sought a Judicial Determination of Habitual Residence, Eric filed the
petition in a Minnesota federal district court. 12 Eric argued that the family
3. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction pmbl., Oct.
25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 [hereinafter Child Abduction Convention]; Sorenson, 563 F.
Supp. 2d at 968 (noting that it was not until the family's visas expired on June 2, 2007, and
Eric sought to bring E. S. S. back to the United States that Janea "retained" E. S. S.).
4. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 963; see also Appellant's Brief at *10, Sorenson v.
Sorenson, No. 08-2098 (8th Cir. filed July 10, 2008), 2008 WL 3977191.
5. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 963; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at *10-
II (describing the infeasibility of maintaining the Minnesota home while in Australia).
6. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 963; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at *13
(discussing Janea's extramarital affair); Appellee's Brief at *9, Sorenson v. Sorenson, No.
08-2098 (8th Cir. filed Aug. 12, 2008), 2008 WL 3977192 (describing the rapid
deterioration of the marriage upon arrival in Australia).
7. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 964; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at *13-
14.
8. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 964; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at *14-
15; Appellee's Brief, supra note 6, at *10.
9. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
10. Id.; see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at *15.
11. Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at *15. The U.S. Central Authority is the primary
contact for child abductions to and from the United States. It is through this office that Child
Abduction Convention petitions can be filed. See United States of America-Central
Authority, Hague Conference on Private International Law, http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/indexen.php?act=-authorities.details&aid=133 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009); U.S.
Department of State, Using the Hague Convention, http://www.travel.state.gov
/family/abduction/Solutions/Solutions_3854.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
12. Appellant's Brief, supra note 3, at *15; Appellee's Brief, supra note 6, at *11. After
the district court determined that E. S. S.'s habitual residence was Australia, Eric Sorenson
appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, arguing that the
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never intended to abandon the United States as its habitual residence and
had planned on returning upon the expiration of their three-year visas. 13
Janea argued that there had been no intention to return to the United States
and that the family had settled into a new life in Australia. 14
The district court, bound by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit's holding in Silverman v. Silverman,15 applied a two-factor test that
looked at Eric and Janea's shared intentions as well as factual evidence of
E. S. S.'s acclimatization. 16 The court determined that the Sorensons'
shared intention was to reside in Australia. 17 The court relied on the fact
that the family had sold their house and cars prior to moving to Australia
and brought most of their personal belongings with them to Australia. 18 As
indicators of E. S. S.'s acclimatization, the court noted that E. S. S. had
enrolled in preschool in Australia, spoke with an Australian accent, had
Australian friends, and had spent the majority of her life in Australia. 19
Because both prongs of the inquiry indicated the same result, the court
concluded that E. S. S.'s habitual residence immediately before her
retention was Australia.20
The facts on which the Minnesota District Court based its holding are
remarkably similar to the facts of countless other Child Abduction
Convention cases. More importantly, the critical question the court faced-
what was E. S. S.'s habitual residence at the time of her retention-is a
question that courts around the country (indeed, around the world) are
asked to decide with increasing frequency. The concept of habitual
residence is the most important threshold determination in Child Abduction
Convention proceedings. 21  First, it is the law of the child's habitual
residence that will decide whether one parent's custody rights have been
breached through a wrongful removal or retention. 22 Second, a child must
be immediately returned to the country of habitual residence. 23
Despite its importance, a lack of guidance as to the definition of habitual
residence has led to a split among courts on how to properly determine a
district court had focused too much on evidence of acclimatization. See Appellant's Brief,
supra note 3, at *21.
13. Appellant's Brief, supra note 4, at *23; Appellee's Brief, supra note 6, at *15.
14. Appellee's Brief, supra note 6, at *15.
15. 338 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003). For a complete discussion of Silverman v. Silverman,
see infra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
16. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969-70 (D. Minn. 2008).
17. Id. at 969 ("[The Sorensons] did not have a definite intention to return to the United
States .... Their shared intention was to live in Australia for an indefinite period of time,
lasting at least three years.").
18. Id. at 970; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 970; see also infra app.
20. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
21. Michael R. Walsh & Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction and the
Hague Convention, 6 BARRY L. REv. 29, 32 (2006).
22. Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of a
Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1049, 1063 (2005).
23. Id.
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child's habitual residence. 24 On the one hand, the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Third and Ninth Circuits have developed a standard for determining
a child's habitual residence that emphasizes the parents' shared intentions. 25
While the Third Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit in Silverman, has attempted
to balance evidence of the child's acclimatization with shared parental
intentions, 26 the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the primary focus should
be on the parents' shared intentions.27 Even where there is no shared intent,
the Ninth Circuit warns against relying on objective facts unless they point
"unequivocally" to a change in habitual residence. 28 On the other hand, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has rejected any reliance on
shared parental intent and refocused the inquiry solely on the child's past
experiences leading up to the moment of removal. 29 This divergence serves
to frustrate the Child Abduction Convention's goal of uniformity in
interpretation of its terms.30
This Note proposes that a uniform standard is necessary to achieve the
aims of the Child Abduction Convention and that the Sixth Circuit's
objective approach best effectuates the convention's intent. The
intermediate approach of the Third and Eighth Circuits, while
understandable in their desire to factor in an assessment of parental
subjective intentions, needlessly complicates what was intended to be a
clean and summary inquiry. Part I of this Note examines the historical
origins of the Child Abduction Convention, its objectives, and its text. Part
I also briefly discusses the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA) 31-the statute enacted by Congress to give the Child Abduction
Convention domestic effect. Finally, Part I explores early consideration of
habitual residence by the Sixth Circuit.
Part II details the split among the federal appellate courts on the proper
way to determine "habitual residence." The current split is deep, but
lopsided. Among the six circuits to have addressed the issue, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits all adhere to some consideration of shared parental intent, while the
Sixth Circuit hews to an objective-evidence-only standard. Part II also
surveys the decisions of a number of foreign courts on the crucial issue of
habitual residence. Such a survey is not only authorized by the
implementing statute's express language, it is also of possible use to future
American court decisions, particularly to the U.S. Supreme Court, should it
decide to resolve this split by granting certiorari in a suitable Child
Abduction Convention case.
24. See infra Parts I.B.2, II.A-B.
25. See Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63
F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995); see also infra Part II.A.
26. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.
27. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076.
28. Id. at 1081.
29. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 991 (6th Cir. 2007); see also infra Part lI.B.
30. See infra Part I.B. 1.
31. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (2006).
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Part III applies the different standards to the facts of the Sorenson case.
Specifically, it shows how the majority approach of factoring in shared
subjective intent (particularly the Ninth Circuit's most extreme version)
complicates an otherwise easy determination of habitual residence. Part III
then argues that the Sixth Circuit's approach, which, though the minority
approach in the United States, is reflected in the majority of foreign
precedents and should be adopted by all the circuits and American state
courts. Part III concludes by addressing how the Sixth Circuit's standard
best accomplishes the objectives of the Child Abduction Convention.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
Some background information about the Child Abduction Convention's
development and text is necessary in order to filly understand how a court
should determine a child's habitual residence and the circuit split that has
developed over the proper standard for this determination. Part L.A first
examines international child abductions prior to the drafting of the Child
Abduction Convention in 1980. Part I.B.1 looks at the Child Abduction
Convention drafters' purposes and objectives. Part I.B.2 discusses the text
of the Child Abduction Convention and, notably, the drafters' silence as to
the definition of habitual residence. Part I.C briefly turns to the passage of
ICARA in 198832 and how the United States has chosen to apply the Child
Abduction Convention. Part I.D discusses the sources a court may turn to
for guidance in interpreting the Child Abduction Convention in a manner
that is aligned with the convention's goal of uniform interpretation.
Finally, Part I.E outlines the beginning of American case law regarding the
habitual residence determination for the purpose of Child Abduction
Convention proceedings.
A. International Child Abductions Prior to 1980
"Child abduction" is defined as any instance where a child is taken away,
without consent or lawful authority, from a person whom the law
recognizes as having a right to care for the child.33 "International" child
abduction is any instance of child abduction that occurs across an
international frontier. 34 While the term "international child abduction" may
have a number of different meanings, 35 for the purpose of the Child
Abduction Convention and this Note, "the phrase [is] synonymous with the
unilateral removal or retention of children by parents, guardians or close
32. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, § 2, 102 Stat.
437 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611).
33. ANNE-MARIE HUTCHINSON & HENRY SETRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD
ABDUCTION 3 (1998).
34. Id.
35. PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 1 (1999) ("The expression 'child abduction' . . . . is
sufficiently wide in meaning to suggest a variety of possible acts, all wrongful and almost
invariably harmful to the children involved.").
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family members." 36  Wrongful removals and retentions are most often
initiated by mothers who have moved abroad with the father of their
children and who then wish to return to their country of origin.37 Typically,
the abducting parent's objective is to gain sole control over the child in a
new jurisdiction. 38
Assessment of the motives for child abduction depends to some extent on
whose perspective is analyzed. 39 The abducting parent may believe that he
or she is acting in the child's best interest, for instance by removing the
child from a dangerous situation or raising the child in a more suitable
environment. 40 Or the abducting parent might simply be tired of the
relationship, or his or her life in a certain country, and wish to return to
familiar surroundings with the child.41 On the other hand, the left-behind
parent might view the abduction as retaliation for ending the marriage. 42
International child abductions did not receive specific recognition as an
issue requiring an international legal solution until the late 1970s,43 when
they were identified as the result of certain "socio-legal and technical
developments." 44 International travel had become easier, and more couples
36. Id. (contrasting this definition with "classic kidnappings" where a third party or
stranger is the abductor); see also Rapport Explicatif de Mlle Elisa Prez- Vera [Explanatory
Report by Elisa Prez- Vera], in 3 CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt,
ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIEME SESSION, ENLIVEMENT D'ENFANTS [HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH
SESSION, CHILD ABDUCTION] 426, 428 (1982) [hereinafter Prez-Vera Report] (noting that
"the situations envisaged are those which derive from the use of force to establish artificial
jurisdictional links on an international level, with a view to obtaining custody of a child").
37. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 3-4, 9. This contrasts with the
traditional, "paradigm case.., of the father who became so frustrated with being denied
access to his child or children after the court had granted sole custody to the mother, that he
stole the child, went abroad, and then underground." Id. at 9.
38. Id. at I (distinguishing this from the "classic kidnapping" objective of material gain).
39. Id. at I I ("It... depends whether one assesses the issue from the perspective of the
abductor, or that of the left-behind parent.").
40. Id.
41. Id. at 11 & n.26 ("It may be noted that the initial relocation of the family may itself
have represented an attempt to 'mend' an ailing relationship.").
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 2-3 ("The origins of international child abductions cannot readily be attributed
to any one cause or event.").
44. Id. at 2; see also Adair Dyer, Rapport sur L 'enlivement International D 'un Enfant
par Un de Ses Parents (aKidnapping L~gab) [Report on International Child Abduction by
One Parent ('Legal Kidnapping)] (1978), in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION, CHILD
ABDUCTION, supra note 36, at 12, 18 [hereinafter Dyer Report] (stating that statistics on
international child abductions were not readily available, but it is generally agreed that there
had been a rapid increase in recent years as a result of a number of underlying factors). The
responses to a questionnaire that asked various governments whether they had statistics
relating to international child abductions show that very few, if any, statistics were available.
Riponses des Gouvernements au Questionnaire [Replies of the Governments to the
Questionnaire] (February 1979), in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION, CHILD ABDUCTION, supra note
36, at 61 passim.
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were travelling across national borders. 45 The ease of international travel
also resulted in a greater number of international marriages. 46 At the same
time, the institution of marriage was changing, with an increase in the
number of separations, divorces, and children born outside of marriage. 47
The confluence of all these developments led to an increase in child custody
disputes with international dimensions. 48 The advancements in technology
that facilitated the "rapid and efficacious interchange of people on the
international level" also enabled the abducting parent to whisk a child
thousands of miles away from the left-behind parent in a matter of hours.49
Research into the rise in international child abductions revealed a number
of inherent difficulties in the proceedings then in force to deal with the
problem:50  first, locating children taken across national borders was
difficult; second, international disputes were expensive and complicated to
resolve; third, local and foreign authorities were often unable or unwilling
to provide assistance; and fourth, characterizing and labeling the problem
was a challenge for the courts.51
In addition, international child abduction proceedings were typically
lengthy because courts were reluctant to take any action without
investigating what would be in the best interests of the abducted child.52
45. Carol S. Bruch, The Hague Child Abduction Convention: Past Accomplishments,
Future Challenges, in GLOBALIZATION OF CHILD LAW: THE ROLE OF THE HAGUE
CONVENTIONS 33, 34 (Sharon Detrick & Paul Vlaardingerbroek eds., 1999); see also
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 2 (noting the increase in individual mobility);
Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 18-19 (finding that "freer crossing of borders, fewer visa
requirements and decreasing rigour of passport control" contributed to more international
movement and greater opportunity for international child abductions).
46. See Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 19 ("The usual underlying condition for the
carrying out of a child abduction by a parent on the international level is, of course, an
'international' family. Here once again the statistics available are not satisfying, but it seems
apparent that for the same reasons as stated above the number of marriages between persons
coming from different countries (and even from different continents) has increased in
absolute and in relative terms."); see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVV, supra note 35, at 10 &
n.21 (discussing the fact that 15.9% of all abductions in the United States resulted from
marriages between parents with different countries of origin (citing R. L. Hegar & G. L.
Greif, Parental Abduction of Children from Interracial and Cross Cultural Marriages, 25 J.
COMP. FAM. STUD. 135, 138 (1994))). For a discussion of the current economic crisis's
effect on international marriages, the complexities of international divorces, and the
resulting increase in international child abductions, see Money in Misery, ECONOMIST, Feb.
7, 2009, at 21.
47. See, e.g., BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 2 n.10 (discussing the rise in
divorces in the United Kingdom).
48. See Bruch, supra note 45, at 34.
49. Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 18.
50. See Bruch, supra note 45, at 34 (noting that the Dyer Report identified "global
problems without global solutions").
51. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 3 (discussing the many reasons why the
chances of recovering an abducted child prior to the Child Abduction Convention were
limited); Bruch, supra note 45, at 34 ("Overwhelming practical difficulties ranged from
locating an abducted child, to the expense and logistics of handling an international dispute,
to obtaining assistance from local and foreign authorities. Legal difficulties were equally
daunting: even characterizing and labeling the problem were challenges ....
52. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 3.
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This best-interests analysis required a personalized inquiry into the interests
of every abducted child.53 However, the vague and indeterminate nature of
such a standard made application difficult.54 This analysis prolonged the
proceedings, which impacted the child as well as the court. 55 Such an
individualized determination also failed to offer any predictability and
allowed courts to "take almost any conceivable measure . . . often
influenced by the moral or social values which prevail[ed] in the society in
question." 56 At the same time, many countries did not use a best-interests
standard, preferring to rely on traditional modes of analysis, which often
exhibited a gender bias.57 A left-behind parent also typically had difficulty
attempting to enforce his or her rights in the home country, since the
abducted child was no longer within that country's borders or subject to its
jurisdiction.58 The left-behind parent was usually forced to pursue a
remedy, if one existed, in the courts of the country in which the child was
physically present. 59 This often resulted in situations where the differing
legal systems and laws in the home country and the country in which the
child was physically present conflicted. 60 Left-behind parents faced the
risk that a court's decision would reflect particular cultural or social
attitudes that were at odds with those in their home courts.61 This lack of
uniformity and predictability was an impetus for the drafting of an
53. Id. at 29 ("Ordinarily in private-law proceedings [best interests] would be applied on
an individual basis with the court acting to secure the particular child's welfare.").
54. Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 22-23 (finding the standard unclear on whether the
interests of the child that are to be served are "those of the immediate aftermath of the
decision, of the adolescence of the child, of young adulthood, maturity, senescence or old
age").
55. Id. at 23-24 (discussing how time is an important factor in the adjustment of the
child and courts may find it difficult to require the return of a child who has been forced to
adjust to a new situation for a long period of time).
56. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 2.
57. Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 22 (reporting that, while "the legal standard used in
most of the countries of the Hague Conference for determination of the custody and care of a
child is keyed to 'the best interests of the child[,]'.... a large number of countries retain the
more traditional legal standards for assignment of custody, which range from establishment
of a presumption or an irrefutable right in favour of the parent of one sex or the other to
systems where the legal dispute over custody centers around the 'fitness' or 'unfitness' of
one of the parents, usually the mother, based on allegations of sexual conduct which may
have little or nothing to the with the actual suitability of the parent to exercise the custody
over and care of the child").
58. HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 33, at 3.
59. Id.; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 2 (indicating that "one
must not overlook the absence of any viable legal remedy").
60. HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 33, at 3.
61. Prez- Vera Report, supra note 36, at 431. For a discussion of various legal systems,
see HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 33, at 61-225 (cataloguing the domestic law of
thirty different jurisdictions); Bruch, supra note 45, at 44-47 (discussing Israel's application
of religious law in the context of best interests analysis once a child has been returned).
Adair Dyer, former deputy secretary general of the Hague Conference, only briefly
mentioned the issue of jurisdiction in his preliminary report, finding the depth of discussion
required to be beyond the scope of his report. Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 35-38.
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international convention on child abduction.62 While differences in choice
of law were not of themselves a major concern, 63 efficiency was: if the
deciding court chose to enter into a lengthy choice-of-law analysis it could
significantly prolong the proceedings. 64 At the extreme, if the abducting
parent had exclusive custody rights under the law of that country, the left-
behind parent would be precluded from seeking any legal remedy. 65 There
was a practical need for action to be taken to protect abducted children and
their left-behind parents. 66 However, until the Hague Conference on
Private International Law began discussing the issue in the late 1970s, all
prior attempts to deal with these issues either failed at the drafting stage or
in their initial implementation. 67
B. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction: A Response
The Child Abduction Convention was introduced for consideration by a
Special Commission convened at the Hague Conference on Private
International Law in January 1976.68 Once it was agreed that the issue of
international child abduction would be addressed at the Fourteenth Session
of the Hague Conference, Adair Dyer, then deputy secretary general of the
Hague Conference, began researching the legal and sociological aspects of
international child abductions. 69 The Special Commission for the Child
Abduction Convention met for the first time in March 1979 to discuss an
approach to the issue of international child abductions. 70 The Special
Commission agreed that a central authority would be established in each
member state to facilitate cooperation across borders, that a left-behind
62. See P&ez-Vera Report, supra note 36, at 431; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY,
supra note 35, at 2 n. 11 (observing that the same situation currently exists where children
are abducted to non-member states).
63. Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 39 (declaring that the "artful abductor" would be
unlikely to knowingly remove a child to a jurisdiction that would apply an unfavorable law).
64. Id.; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
65. Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 39.
66. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 3.
67. Id. at 3 & nn.14-15 (finding that this was the case with what would have been
Article 6 of the 1961 Hague Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law
Applicable in Respect of the Protection of Infants, as well as the 1980 European Convention
on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on
Restoration of Custody of Children).
68. Id. at 16-17; Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 12 (observing that the proposal was
made by the Expert of Canada, T. Bradbrooke Smith, at a Special Commission meeting for
the purpose of considering subjects to be included on the agenda for future conferences).
69. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 17. Dyer's research was the basis for
what this Note refers to as the Dyer Report. See Dyer Report, supra note 44 passim.
70. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 18; see also Conclusions des
Discussions de la Commission Spiciale de Mars 1979 sur le Kidnapping L~gal [Conclusions
Drawn from the Discussions of the Special Commission of March 1979 on Legal
Kidnapping] (June 1979), in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTS
AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION, CHILD ABDUCTION, supra note 36, at 162,
162 [hereinafter Conclusions of the Special Commission] (observing that the Special
Commission had before it the Dyer Report).
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parent could apply for automatic return of an abducted child within six
months of the abduction, and that, even if more than six months had
elapsed, a court could only assume jurisdiction for a merits hearing if it
considered the child a habitual resident of that country.71 These working
principles would form the basis for the Special Commission's preliminary
draft treaty.72 The Child Abduction Convention in its present form was
prepared during the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference from
October 6 to October 25, 1980.73  Reflecting the universal view that
international child abductions were a serious problem that needed to be
addressed, the Child Abduction Convention was adopted by a unanimous
vote of the twenty-three countries present, including the United States, and
immediately signed by four of those countries on October 25, 1980. 74
Currently, eighty-one countries, including the United States, are signatories
to the Child Abduction Convention. 75
1. Purposes and Objectives
The stated objectives of the Child Abduction Convention are twofold: "a
to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in
any Contracting State; and b to ensure that rights of custody and of access
under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting States." 76  The deliberate wording of Article 1 ("prompt")
ensured that courts in international child abduction proceedings no longer
engaged in lengthy and detailed investigations into the best interests of the
child.77 The Child Abduction Convention envisions that a court presented
71. See Conclusions of the Special Commission, supra note 70, passim; BEAUMONT &
MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 18-20. Under the Child Abduction Convention, the central
authorities of the abducted-to and left-behind countries (assuming both are signatories to the
convention) are responsible for processing petitions and coordinating proceedings. Thus, it
is theoretically only necessary to file a petition in one country; however, there is nothing in
the convention that prevents a left-behind parent from filing petitions in both countries.
72. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 20-22 (addressing the drafting process).
Many of the Special Commission's discussions were catalogued in the report that
accompanied the draft. Rapport de la Commission Sp~ciale Etabli par Mile Elisa Prez- Vera
[Report of the Special Commission by Elisa Prez-Vera], in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION, CHILD
ABDUCTION, supra note 36, at 172 passim [hereinafter Report of the Special Commission].
73. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 22-23 (discussing the meeting of the
Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference); Prez-Vera Report, supra note 36, at 426
(noting that Elisa Prez-Vera was appointed the reporter for both the Special Commission
and during the fourteenth session of the Hague Conference).
74. Prez-Vera Report, supra note 36, at 426 & n.1.
75. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table, http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index..en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
76. Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 1. When read together, the Preamble
and Article I show that the drafters did not seek to protect children from the removal or
retention itself because "a prima facie wrongful removal or retention might actually serve a
child's interests." BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 28-29.
77. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 29 ("It was imperative.., that in its
objectives [the Child Abduction Convention sought] to break the existing mindset before
replacing it with its own model, the qualified summary-return mechanism."); see also Walsh
& Savard, supra note 21, at 33 ("Evidence relevant to custody or the best interest of the
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with an international child abduction case simply considers it as an
application for an administrative return, rather than a full-blown traditional
custody determination. 78 The drafters of the Child Abduction Convention
recognized that one of the basic tenets of family law is the importance of a
child's interests and welfare in matters relating to his or her custody;
however that was not the goal that the Child Abduction Convention was
designed to accomplish. 79 The goal of the Child Abduction Convention is
to further the interests of all children affected by international child
abductions collectively without individualized best-interests inquiries.80
The Child Abduction Convention drafters sought to achieve this goal
through the formulation of a single overarching rule: wrongfully removed
or retained children must be returned to their habitual residence as quickly
as possible. 81
The practical purpose of the Child Abduction Convention is to recast the
function of the courts of its member states according to this image of the
return process. Under the Child Abduction Convention, proceedings are
subject to a "summary-return mechanism." 82  Rather than deciding the
merits of the substantive custody case, courts merely determine what a
child's habitual residence is, whether a child has been wrongfully removed
from his or her habitual residence or retained in a country other than his or
her habitual residence, and, if so, order the child's return so that the court of
the child's habitual residence can decide the underlying substantive custody
issues. 83 This enables a restoration of the status quo and allows a child to
be returned to the place with which he or she is most familiar and has the
greatest connection, and, accordingly, where the authorities are "best placed
to determine the child's future." 84 The application of a single rule promotes
child are excluded, and the inquiry is limited to whether the child has been wrongfully
removed or wrongfully retained from his nation of habitual residence." (citing Nunez-
Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995))).
78. Silberman, supra note 22, at 1063.
79. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 29; PNrez-Vera Report, supra note 36,
at 431 ("[The] two paragraphs in the preamble reflect quite clearly the philosophy of the
[Child Abduction] Convention .... [T]he struggle against the great increase in international
child abductions must always be inspired by the desire to protect children and should be
based upon an interpretation of their true interests.").
80. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 29 & n.8 (indicating that the novelty of
the Child Abduction Convention lies in the fact "that the welfare of the individual child is
not the first and paramount consideration"); see also Report of the Special Commission,
supra note 72, at 182 (discussing the place given to the interests of the child); PNrez- Vera
Report, supra note 36, at 431 (explaining why there is no explicit reference to "best
interests" in the Child Abduction Convention); supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text
(discussing the difficulties a best interests analysis posed).
81. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 29-30.
82. Id. at 29.
83. Id. at 29-30; Silberman, supra note 22, at 1063 (finding that "the usual kind of 'best
interests' evaluation that a judge makes in a custody case is not called for in a [Child
Abduction Convention] case because the 'best interests' determination is to be made back in
the courts of the State of the habitual residence after the child has been returned").
84. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 30; see also Prez-Vera Report, supra
note 36, at 430.
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certainty and allows for expeditious handling of cases. 8 5 More importantly,
the Child Abduction Convention discourages parents from unilaterally
removing their children in order to use them as instruments to obtain a
convenient and favorable forum in which to air their custody disputes.86
One other important procedural goal of the Child Abduction
Convention's drafters was to maximize the convention's practical
effectiveness through uniformity in interpretation and application among
member states.87 The importance of this goal lies in the need and desire of
the drafters to establish a new standard for dealing with international child
abduction cases. 88 Without this goal and the cooperation of the early
member states, the Child Abduction Convention would have been severely
weakened and would likely have failed as its predecessors did.89 A number
of factors have contributed to the promotion of a uniform interpretation,
including an overwhelming aspiration to stop international child abductions
and the simplicity of the Child Abduction Convention's text.90
2. What the Text Says (and Does Not Say)
The Child Abduction Convention applies to any child under the age of
sixteen who was habitually resident in a member state immediately before
his or her wrongful removal or retention. 91  The Child Abduction
Convention considers a removal or retention of a child wrongful where
a it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution
or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in
which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal
or retention; and
b at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised,
either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the
removal or retention.92
85. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 30; see also supra Part L.A (discussing
the uncertain, lengthy proceedings that occurred prior to the Child Abduction Convention).
86. Silberman, supra note 22, at 1054; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note
35, at 30 (describing how awareness of the Child Abduction Convention will deter parents
from "removing or retaining [their] children abroad"); Prez-Vera Report, supra note 36, at
429 ("[Ilt can firmly be stated that the problem with which the [Child Abduction]
Convention deals.., derives all of its legal importance from the possibility of individuals
establishing legal and jurisdictional links which are more or less artificial.").
87. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 226; see also In re H, [1998] A.C. 72,
87 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) ("An international Convention . . . cannot be
construed differently in different jurisdictions. The [Child Abduction] Convention must
have the same meaning and effect under the laws of all contracting states.").
88. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 226.
89. Id.; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
90. BEAUMONT & McELEAVY, supra note 35, at 226.
91. Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 4; see also BEAUMONT &
MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 36-37 (emphasizing that a child older than sixteen is
presumed to have a mind of his or her own that cannot be ignored).
92. Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 3; see also BEAUMONT &
MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 37-44 (defining wrongful retention or removal).
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Article 5 goes on to define such terms as "rights of custody" and "rights of
access." 93 A right of custody is any right relating to the care of the child,
particularly the right to determine a child's residence, whereas a right of
access includes the right to take a child for a limited time away from the
child's habitual residence. 94 These rights represent "an identifiable legal
link between an individual and a child. If either right is breached, the
legally responsible individual who has been disadvantaged will be able to
petition for its restoration. '95 This enables a restoration of the status quo in
the child's interests.96
While the Child Abduction Convention is explicit in its definition of
certain key terms, this Note focuses on one important aspect of the Child
Abduction Convention that the drafters left undefined in the text: habitual
residence. The habitual residence determination is the basis on which the
Child Abduction Convention's "summary return mechanism" is founded. 97
The importance of determining a child's habitual residence is underscored
by the inclusion of the term in various articles of the Child Abduction
Convention. First, the objective of any Child Abduction Convention is to
return a wrongfully removed or retained child to his or her habitual
residence. 98 In addition, a child must be habitually resident in a member
state in order for a proceeding to fall under the Child Abduction
Convention.99 Finally, a child's habitual residence plays a critical role in
determining whether a child was, in fact, wrongfully removed or retained
under the Child Abduction Convention's definition:100
[I]n laying down the conditions which have to be met for any unilateral
change in the status quo to be regarded as wrongful, [Article 3] indirectly
brings into clear focus those relationships which the [Child Abduction]
Convention seeks to protect. Those relationships are based upon. .. the
existence of rights of custody attributed by the State of the child's
habitual residence .... 101
93. Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 5.
94. Id. The issue of rights of custody and access are not important for this Note, but
simply serve to show the deliberate choice the Child Abduction Convention drafters made to
define certain terms, but not others. For a discussion of rights of custody, see BEAUMONT &
McELEAVY, supra note 35, at 45-87.
95. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 86.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 88.
98. See Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.; see also Silberman, supra
note 22, at 1063 ("[I]f the child is already at the habitual residence, there is no need for
return.").
99. See Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 4; see also BEAUMONT &
MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 39 ("[T]he essential element in a wrongful removal is the fact
that a child habitually resident in one Contracting State is moved to another Contracting
State.").
100. See Child Abduction Convention, supra note 3, art. 3; see also Phrez-Vera Report,
supra note 36, at 444 ("[T]he duty to return a child arises only if its removal or retention is
considered wrongful in terms of the Convention.").
101. P~rez-Vera Report, supra note 36, at 444. "The (Child Abduction] Convention is
intended to defend those relationships which are already protected, at any rate by virtue of an
apparent right to custody in the State of the child's habitual residence." Id.
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Despite the importance that determining a child's habitual residence
plays in Child Abduction Convention proceedings, it is a tradition of the
Hague Conferences not to define this term. 10 2 However it is considered a
"well-established concept" in the Hague Conferences that habitual
residence is different from the concept of domicile. 103 Domicile requires an
intent to reside in a country of choice permanently or indefinitely, as well as
actual physical presence in that country. 104 One must have, in addition to
an intent to reside in the country of new domicile, an intent to leave the
country of previous domicile. 10 5 Consideration of a person's intention to
remain in a place is complex and intricate, and courts must often make
determinations of domicile without the guidance of concrete rules. 106
In contrast, it has been deemed essential to treat the term "habitual
residence" according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the two
words. 10 7 "Residence" implies something more than mere presence in a
country. 10 8 "Habitual" indicates a quality of residence, duration being only
one relevant factor. 109 Putting these words together, "habitual residence"
might mean a "'regular physical presence which must endure for some
time."' 110 The use of habitual residence as a legal standard results, first,
from the plain fact that a domiciliary-style intent test would be complicated
to apply to children and, second, from its flexibility, as opposed to that of
the concepts of domicile and nationality, in responding to the demands of
our society. "' This flexibility is also the reason why the Hague Conference
102. Id. at 441, 451; see also A. V. DICEY & J. H. C. MORRIS, DICEY & MORRIS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS para. 6-123 (Lawrence Collins ed., 13th ed. 2000) ("No definition of
habitual residence has ever been included in a Hague Convention; this has been a matter of
deliberate policy.").
103. Prez-Vera Report, supra note 36, at 445. The Prez-Vera Report also states that
habitual residence is a question of pure fact. Id. This Note declines to address what the
proper standard of review for a habitual residence determination should be. It is generally
agreed by the circuits that there should be a mixed standard of review; a district court's
findings of fact should be reviewed for clear error, and its legal determination and
application of the law to the facts should be reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Tenorio,
392 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11 th Cir. 2004).
104. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 102, para. 6-005. The United States, showing its
common-law roots, has an identical definition of domicile. See, e.g., 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 6
(2008) (noting that the addition of intent to remain in a place is the distinguishing factor
between domicile and residence); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Domicil § 6 (2004) ("Domicil of choice,
generally, consists of a bodily presence in a particular locality and a concurrent intent to
remain there permanently or at least indefinitely").
105. DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 102, para. 6-039.
106. Id. para. 6-048 ("There is ... no circumstance or group of circumstances which
furnishes any definite criterion of the existence of the intention. A circumstance which is
treated as decisive in one case may be disregarded in another, or even relied upon to support
a different conclusion.").
107. Id. para. 6-123 (contrasting this with domicile, which is essentially a term of art).
108. See id. para. 6-115. Residence can also be established without any mental element.
Id. para. 6-034.
109. Id. para. 6-124 (quoting Cruse v. Chittum [1974] 2 All E.R. 940, 942 (H.L) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K.)). This can be compared with "ordinary residence," which implies
"an element of continuity, order, or settled purpose." Id. para. 6-118.
110. Id. para. 6-124 (quoting Cruse, 2 All E.R. at 942).
111. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 89.
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and the convention drafters have traditionally found the need for definition
futile.' 12 Despite its lack of definition, the concept of habitual residence
has been "closely connected with the Hague Conference and for many years
has been regarded as the primary connecting factor employed in initiatives
undertaken by that body." 113  While the drafters believed that such
flexibility and ambiguity would allow courts to come to the most
appropriate solution in most cases, the concept had yet to be applied by
courts in international child abduction cases. 14
However, in the years following the adoption of the Child Abduction
Convention by the original signatory states, a large body of case law has
developed regarding how a court should determine a child's habitual
residence.11 5 Some of this case law has restrained the discretion of judges
in determining whether a habitual residence has been gained or lost and
impeded the fulfillment of the drafters' goal that habitual residence ought to
designate the forum conveniens for subsequent hearings on the merits of the
underlying custody case.1 16 This combination of judicial recognition of the
importance of the habitual residence determination and the Child Abduction
Convention text's ambiguity as to the proper definition of habitual
residence practically guarantees that there will be a conflict among courts
as to the proper standard to be used in determining a child's habitual
residence.
C. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA)
While the United States was one of the original countries that voted to
adopt the Child Abduction Convention on October 25, 1980, it did not
become a signatory until December 23, 1981.117 Furthermore, the United
States did not officially make the Child Abduction Convention effective as
a matter of domestic law until Congress enacted ICARA on April 29,
1988.118 Implementing legislation was required because the Child
112. Id.; see also DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 102, para. 6-123 (indicating that "the aim
[was] to leave the notion free from technical rules which can produce rigidity and
inconsistencies as between different legal systems").
113. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 88.
114. Id. at89.
115. Id. at 90; see also Rhona Schuz, Policy Considerations in Determining the Habitual
Residence of a Child and the Relevance of Context, II J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 103
(2001) (discussing how the reports of the Special Commission "pay only limited attention to
the issue of determining habitual residence" because they presume that there is little
difficulty in determining habitual residence and yet there is considerable difficulty in
determining habitual residence in "borderline" cases that involve relocation).
116. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 90.
117. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra note 75; see also
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 23 (noting that Canada, France, Greece, and
Switzerland signed on October 25, 1980); P~rez- Vera Report, supra note 36, at 426 n. 1.
118. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, § 2, 102 Stat.
437 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 (2006)); see also
HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 33, at 210; Hague Conference on Private International
Law, supra note 75.
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Abduction Convention was not self-executing in the United States. 119 With
its passage, ICARA incorporated by reference the Child Abduction
Convention 120 and detailed procedures for how the Convention would be
implemented in the United States. 121 For instance, ICARA established
concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts over Child
Abduction Convention proceedings. 122 ICARA also specified that the
petitioner has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that a child has been wrongfully removed or retained. 123 However, with
respect to the substantive terms, American courts must still, as the Supreme
Court has shown, look directly to the Child Abduction Convention for
guidance. 12
4
D. Methods ofAchieving a Uniform Interpretation
Despite the drafters' goal of uniformity in interpretation, there is no
international tribunal vested with authoritative interpretive power. 125 While
the Convention's text is relatively simple, 126 this lack of overarching
guidance has important implications for certain terms, such as habitual
residence, on which the text is silent. 127 Foremost, there is the potential
that the goals of the Child Abduction Convention will be impeded. 12 8 A
judge in a national court has a twofold role in every Child Abduction
Convention proceeding: he is pronouncing national law because the treaty
is a part of the national law of each country that signs it, but he is also
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 cmt. h (1987) ("[T]he intention of the United States determines whether an agreement
is to be self-executing in the United States or should await implementation by legislation or
appropriate executive or administrative action. If the international agreement is silent as to
its self-executing character and the intention of the United States is unclear, account must be
taken of any statement by the President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it to the
Senate for consent or to the Congress as a whole for approval, and of any expression by the
Senate or by Congress in dealing with the agreement."); see also BEAUMONT & McELEAVY,
supra note 35, at 248 & n.60 (comparing the United States with France, where the Child
Abduction Convention is self-executing).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1160 1(b)(2) ("The provisions of this chapter are in addition to and not in
lieu of the provisions of the Convention.").
121. Id. § 11601(b)(1).
122. Id. § 11603(a); Walsh & Savard, supra note 21, at 51.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1).
124. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (describing how the
definition of the term "accident" was discerned from the Warsaw Convention's text and
history).
125. Silberman, supra note 22, at 1057.
126. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
127. Silberman, supra note 22, at 1057 ("[T]he effectiveness of the [Child Abduction]
Convention is left in the hands of... the national courts that implement and interpret the
Convention."); see also BEAUMONT & McELEAVY, supra note 35, at 229 (noting that, while
the simplicity of the text has reduced the difficulties of interpreting the Child Abduction
Convention, there are still problematic areas).
128. Silberman, supra note 22, at 1059 ("If [Child Abduction] Convention cases become
subject to varying national approaches and perspectives, neither of the core objectives of the
treaty-deterring abductions and directing adjudication of custody cases to the State of the
child's habitual residence-will be possible."); see also supra Part I.B. 1.
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contributing to the development of international law, of which the treaty is
an embodiment. 129 How should a court balance this conflict of national and
international law, while remaining faithful to the goals of the Child
Abduction Convention, when faced with interpreting and determining
habitual residence?
One of the most important sources of guidance in interpreting
international law is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention). 130  The Vienna Convention provides a framework for
interpreting treaties founded on principles of customary international
law. 131 Section 3 of the Vienna Convention, in particular, provides a
number of rules for the interpretation of international treaties. 132 Article 31
mandates that a treaty be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of its terms given their context, objectives, and
purpose. 133 In addition, Article 32 states,
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its
conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application
of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation
according to article 31:
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.1 34
Although the United States is a signatory to the Vienna Convention, the
Senate has not ratified the treaty.' 35 Thus, the Vienna Convention does not
apply in the United States as a matter of domestic treaty law. However,
many of the rules of interpretation memorialized in the Vienna Convention
have force as expressions of customary international law. 136 In fact, the
Supreme Court has advocated methods for interpreting international treaties
similar to those laid out in the Vienna Convention. In a case that discussed
the interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court directed
federal courts to give the words of a treaty a meaning that is consistent with
129. Silberman, supra note 22, at 1057.
130. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
131. Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 437 (2004).
132. Id. at 438 (describing the goal of interpretation as "elucidation of the meaning of the
text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties" (quoting Reports of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
220, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1)).
133. Vienna Convention, supra note 130, art. 31, § 1.
134. Id. art. 32.
135. Criddle, supra note 131, at 443 (discussing the fact that, while the United States is a
signatory to the Vienna Convention, the treaty entered into force on January 27, 1980, and
remains, without U.S. ratification).
136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
325 cmt. a (1987) (noting that, while the Vienna Convention does not strictly govern
interpretation by courts, it "represents generally accepted principles and the United States
has also appeared willing to accept them"); Criddle, supra note 131, at 443.
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the shared expectations of the other signatory nations. 137 The Supreme
Court recognized that interpreting multinational treaties differs from
interpreting pure domestic law and acknowledged that treaties should be
construed more liberally. 138 Indeed, the Court deemed it proper to refer to
the records of a treaty's drafting and negotiation when interpreting its
text.1 39 The Court also advocated consideration of court opinions from
other signatory countries when interpreting the text of international
treaties. 140
Thus, in interpreting the term "habitual residence" and deciding what the
proper standard should be for determining a child's habitual residence, the
circuits must consider not only American court precedent, but also the
treatment of the Child Abduction Convention by other signatory
countries. 141 Furthermore, the published "travaux pr~paratoires" of the
Child Abduction Convention, the materials detailing the development and
negotiation of the treaty, 142 provide endless information about the drafting
history and debates that took place during the negotiations of the Child
Abduction Convention and are another valuable aid for interpretation. 143
137. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985); see also Olympic Airways v. Husain,
540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004).
138. Air France, 470 U.S. at 397 (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318
U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)); Silberman, supra note 22, at 1060.
139. Air France, 470 U.S. at 400 (commenting on the fact that courts frequently refer to
the "travaux pr~paratoires," documents that catalogue the development of a treaty, to resolve
ambiguities in text); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 325 cmt. e (1987) (remarking that the U.S. Supreme Court is much more
amiable toward the use of travaux prparatoires than the Vienna Convention). This is
analogous to referring to a statute's legislative history in considering the intent of legislators
where a statute's text is ambiguous. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 246 (2004).
140. Air France, 470 U.S. at 404 ("[W]e 'find the opinions of our sister signatories to be
entitled to considerable weight."' (quoting Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d
913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978))); see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 236
(discussing the Supreme Court's holding in Air France that considerable weight should be
given to the well-reasoned opinions of other member states); Silberman, supra note 22, at
1062 ("With respect to courts in the United States faced with an issue of interpretation of the
[Child Abduction] Convention, the Supreme Court in the Air France v. Saks case made
particular reference to the desirability of looking to the opinions of other signatory countries
in interpreting an international convention.").
141. While American courts have looked to other common-law jurisdictions for guidance
on the habitual residence inquiry, there are a number of cases from civil-law jurisdictions
that have largely been ignored. See infra Part II.C.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
325 cmt. e (1987).
143. See Criddle, supra note 131, at 452, 455; Silberman, supra note 22, at 1060-61
("The direction to consult supplementary materials is particularly important in respect to the
[Child] Abduction Convention because... the 'travaux pr~paratoires' of the Convention
are easily accessible in the Acts and Documents of the 14th Session (Tome III) on Child
Abduction, Oct. 6-25, 1980. Included in that material is the P6rez-Vera Explanatory Report,
which serves as the official commentary on the Convention." (citing 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION,
CHILD ABDUCTION, supra note 36)).
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E. The Beginning ofAmerican Habitual Residence Jurisprudence
The first major case in the United States to consider the issue of habitual
residence for the purpose of Child Abduction Convention proceedings was
Friedrich v. Friedrich.144 In 1993, the Sixth Circuit addressed the case of
Thomas, the German-born son of Jeana, a U.S. citizen stationed at the army
base in Bad Aibling, Germany, and Emanuel, a German citizen employed
on the base as a bartender. 145 The Friedrichs' three years of marriage were
filled with arguments, informal separations, and reconciliations. 146 On
August 1, 1991, after a particularly heated argument, Jeana left Germany
with Thomas for the United States. 147
At the time the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of habitual residence,
there was very little case law on the Child Abduction Convention
worldwide and no case law in the United States to provide guidance. 148
The court held that "habitual residence pertains to customary residence
prior to the removal[, and that t]he court must look back in time, not
forward."' 149 In rejecting any consideration of Mrs. Friedrich's intentions,
the court stated that it was concerned solely with the child's habitual
residence and rejected the parents' plans as irrelevant. 150  The court
summarized that "habitual residence must not be confused with domicile.
To determine the habitual residence, the court must focus on the child, not
the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions." 51
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit determined that Thomas's habitual residence
was Germany and that his mother had wrongfully removed him to the
United States. 152 Whether or not subsequent courts have chosen to follow
the holding of Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit's analysis has provided the
foundation for determining habitual residence in Child Abduction
Convention proceedings before U.S. courts. 153
144. Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich 1), 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993). The Sixth
Circuit remanded to the district court the issue of whether, under German law, Emanuel
Friedrich was exercising his custody rights at the time of removal and whether Jeana
Friedrich had any affirmative defenses. Id. at 1403. The district court found that Mr.
Friedrich was exercising his custody rights and Mrs. Friedrich had not established any
affirmative defenses, and the case was again appealed to the Sixth Circuit. Friedrich v.
Friedrich (Friedrich I1), 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir. 1996). Friedrich II affirmed the
district court's holding, but did not revisit the issue of habitual residence and will not be
discussed in this Note; Friedrich I will be referred to simply as "Friedrich."
145. Friedrich I, 983 F.2d at 1398.
146. Id. at 1399.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1400-01.
149. Id. at 1401.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1402.
153. See infra Part II.A-B.
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II. DECIDING WHAT A COURT SHOULD CONSIDER IN DETERMINING A
CHILD'S HABITUAL RESIDENCE
Part I of this Note laid out the history and objectives of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, focusing
specifically on the importance of determining a child's habitual residence
and the lack of guidance provided in defining "habitual residence." Part II
further focuses on the ambiguity of what the proper habitual residence
determination should be by exploring the judicial division that currently
exists between the U.S. circuit courts, as well as between foreign common-
law and civil-law courts.
In 1995, the Third Circuit in Feder v. Evans-Feder154 defined the
habitual residence determination as consisting of an analysis of the child's
circumstances and the parents' shared intentions. 155 In 2001, the Ninth
Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes156 went even further by declaring that the
principal focus of a court's analysis should be the parents' shared
intentions. 157 The Ninth Circuit discouraged reliance on objective factors
except where the facts "point unequivocally to a person's ordinary or
habitual residence being in a particular place."'158 Contrary to the views of
the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich159 and more
recently in Robert v. Tesson 160 has consistently advocated the use of a
purely objective analysis in determining a child's habitual residence.
Part II.A explains the approaches of the Third and Ninth Circuits and
how the Feder and Mozes tests have influenced the majority of other
circuits. Part II.B details how and why the Sixth Circuit chose to diverge
from the reasoning of the Third and Ninth Circuits. Part II.C concludes by
analyzing the division among foreign courts as to the proper standard for
determining a child's habitual residence.
A. The Third & Ninth Circuit Approach: Shared Parental Intent
The Third and Ninth Circuits share a similar method of determining a
child's habitual residence when presented with a Child Abduction
Convention proceeding. Part II.A. 1 discusses the Third Circuit's standard
as addressed in Feder. Part II.A.2 discusses the Ninth Circuit's standard as
addressed in Mozes. Part II.A.3 considers how other circuits have been
influenced by the Feder and Mozes standards.
154. 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995).
155. Id. at 224.
156. 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
157. Id. at 1076.
158. Id. at 1081 (quoting Zenel v. Haddow [1993] S.C. 612, 617 (Scot.)).
159. Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich 1), 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
160. 507 F.3d 981, 993 (6th Cir. 2007).
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1. Third Circuit: Feder v. Evans-Feder
Edward and Melissa-Ann Feder were American citizens who met and
married in Germany in 1987.161 Their only child, Evan, was born in
Germany in 1990.162 Soon after Evan's birth, the family moved back to the
United States for Mr. Feder's job and, three years later, began making plans
to move to Australia. 163 On January 8, 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Feder landed in
Australia with Evan. 164 By May of that year, Mrs. Feder had decided to
leave her husband and return to the United States with Evan. 165 Mr. Feder
arranged round-trip tickets to Pennsylvania for Mrs. Feder and Evan,
believing they were visiting her parents, but when he joined them a few
weeks later, Mrs. Feder served him with divorce and custody papers. 166 In
September 1994, Mr. Feder commenced an action in a Pennsylvania federal
district court pursuant to the Child Abduction Convention alleging that Mrs.
Feder had wrongfully retained Evan and requesting his return. 167
As only the second federal court of appeals to have addressed the issue of
habitual residence at that time, the Third Circuit, while recognizing the
importance of habitual residence as a threshold issue in Child Abduction
Convention proceedings, suffered from a dearth of guidance.168 In reaching
its definition of habitual residence, the Third Circuit relied on the nascent
body of case law available 69 -the Sixth Circuit's decision in Friedrich and
In re Bates,170 a case from the United Kingdom. The Third Circuit
highlighted important aspects of the Friedrich court's analysis, particularly
that any habitual residence inquiry must focus on the child and look back in
time, without regard to either parent's future intentions. 171 However, the
Third Circuit relied mainly on what it considered to be the "governing
principle" of Bates: that "there must be a degree of settled purpose. The
purpose may be one or there may be several. It may be specific or
general .... All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one
does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as
settled."' 72 The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that "a child's habitual
161. Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 218 (3d Cir. 1995).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 219.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 220.
167. Id. Edward Feder also commenced Child Abduction Convention proceedings
simultaneously in Australia, where it was deemed that Evan Feder was a habitual resident of
Australia and that Melissa-Ann Feder's retention was wrongful under the Convention. Id.
168. Id. at 222.
169. Id.
170. (1989) CA 122/89, slip op. (High Ct. of Justice, Fam. Div., Royal Cts. of Justice),
http://www.hiltonhouse.com/cases/Batesuk.txt.
171. Feder, 63 F.3d at 222 (quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich 1), 983 F.2d 1396,
1401-02); see also supra Part I.E.
172. Feder, 63 F.3d at 223 (quoting In re Bates, (1989) CA 122/89); see also infra notes
275-87 and accompanying text. Although the citation is omitted from the Third Circuit's
opinion, Justice John Waite in In re Bates was actually referring to Lord Leslie Scarman's
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residence is the place where he or she has been physically present for an
amount of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a 'degree of
settled purpose' from the child's perspective."' 73  This articulation of
"settled purpose" as influenced by Bates focuses on the parents' current
shared intentions regarding their child's presence in that country, as well as
the child's experiences in his or her country of habitual residence. 174
The Third Circuit then applied its standard to determine Evan's habitual
residence immediately prior to his alleged wrongful retention.' 75 The court
looked first to Evan's "circumstances." Evan had been in Australia for six
months, which the court deemed a considerable amount of time given his
age, and was enrolled in preschool and kindergarten in Australia, activities
that the court considered central to a child's life. 176 The court then looked
at the Feders' "shared intentions" regarding Evan. The court recognized
that the Feders had agreed to move to Australia as a family with the
intention of making a new home for themselves.177 Accordingly, it decided
that Mrs. Feder's intent not to remain in Australia could not override the
objective factual evidence or prior shared intentions indicative of a settled
purpose to stay in Australia. 178 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that
Evan's habitual residence was Australia.' 79
2. Ninth Circuit: Mozes v. Mozes
Six years after the Third Circuit addressed the issue of habitual residence
in Feder, the Ninth Circuit heard the case of Mozes v. Mozes.180 Amon and
Michal were married in 1982 in Israel and had four children. 181 The family
remained together in Israel until 1997, when Michal decided to move the
children to Los Angeles.182 Although Amon remained in Israel, he gave his
consent for the move, paid for their home and car in Los Angeles, and
occasionally visited the family there.' 83 A year after arriving in the United
States, Michal filed for a dissolution of the marriage and custody of the
opinion from Regina v. Barnet London Borough Council, [1983] 2 A.C. 309, 343 (H.L.
1982) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
173. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224; see also Michelle Morgan Kelly, Note, Taking Liberties: The
Third Circuit Defines "Habitual Residence" Under the Hague Convention on International
Child Abduction, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1069, 1080-81 (1996) (discussing the Third Circuit's
reliance on Bates and Friedrich in developing its definition of habitual residence).
174. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 106; infra app.
177. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224; see also infra app.
178. Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.
179. Id. at 225.
180. 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
181. Id. at 1069.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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children. 184 Arnon commenced an action under the Child Abduction
Convention seeking to have the children returned to Israel.' 85
Recognizing that habitual residence is "the central-often outcome-
determinative-concept on which the entire system is founded," the Ninth
Circuit began its analysis by considering the relevance of intent. 186 The
court acknowledged that "simple observation" of a child would be the most
straightforward way to determine his or her habitual residence. 187
However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this straightforward approach as having
a fatal flaw.188 It argued that observation could yield different results based
on the observer's time frame and that such impreciseness is unavoidable
because it is impossible to determine the duration necessary for adequate
observation.' 89
The Ninth Circuit concluded that close attention must be paid to
subjective intent. 190 The Ninth Circuit found support for its reliance on
subjective intent in Lord Leslie Scarman's discussion of settled purpose in
another British case, Regina v. Barnet London Borough Council.191 There,
Lord Scarman stated, "[a]ll that is necessary is that the purpose of living
where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly
described as settled."' 92 The Ninth Circuit agreed that being habitually
resident in a place must mean that a person is settled, but deemed the
concept of settled purpose alone insufficient to determine a child's habitual
residence. 193 In order for a person to acquire a new habitual residence,
some intention to abandon the current residence must also be present.' 94
With the concept of intent as the bedrock of its habitual residence
determination, the Ninth Circuit then contemplated whose intent must be
considered. 195 The court again acknowledged that the obvious answer
would be the child's, because it is the child's habitual residence that the
court must determine. 196 However, the Ninth Circuit found that children
(in general and particularly those subjected to Child Abduction Convention
proceedings) "normally lack the material and psychological wherewithal to
decide where they will reside." 197 Thus, it is the intent of the person or
184. Id.
185. Id. Arnon and Michal Mozes's eldest child elected to return to Israel and did so by
mutual agreement, so the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered only the
habitual residence of the three youngest children. Id.
186. Id. at 1072-73.
187. Id. at 1073-74 ("Under this approach, we might say that if we observe someone
centering his life around a particular location during a given period, so that every time he
goes away from it he also comes back, we will call this his habitual residence.").
188. Id. at 1074.
189. Id. (quoting Adderson v. Adderson, [1987] 51 Alta. L.R.2d 193, 198 (Can.)).
190. Id.
191. [1983] 2 A.C. 309, 343 (H.L. 1982) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
192. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Regina, [1983] 2 A.C. at 344).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1075.
195. Id. at 1076.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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persons entitled to fix the child's place of residence-usually the parents-
that must be taken into account.198 The court, however, recognized that this
is difficult where, as in most Child Abduction Convention proceedings,
these parties are estranged and unlikely to agree on anything. 199 The Ninth
Circuit found the most difficult situations to be the in-between cases where
one parent consented to let a child stay abroad for an indefinite duration.200
It is in these cases that all available evidence must be considered to
determine whether the parents intended to change the child's habitual
residence.201
After determining that it is the parents' shared subjective intent that is
relevant to a determination of habitual residence, the Ninth Circuit
addressed, when, if at all, the child's objective circumstances should be
considered. 20 2 The court recognized that a change in habitual residence
cannot be accomplished by wishful thinking and that an actual change in
geography and the passage of an appreciable amount of time sufficient for
acclimatization is required.203 The Ninth Circuit questioned if and when
evidence of acclimatization could establish a child's habitual residence,
even with contrary parental intent.204 Although focusing on a child's
contacts with a new country is a more straightforward and objective
approach that would enable courts to avoid taking a child from his or her
familiar surroundings, the Ninth Circuit deemed these reasons to have only
a "superficial appeal. '205  The court found that the Child Abduction
Convention was designed to reduce the incentive to seek unilateral custody
over a child and any standard that would make it easier to shift habitual
residence without the consent of both parents would act contrary to that
goal.20 6 The court rejected a reliance on acclimatization and reasoned that
children are adaptable and able to form intense attachments in a short
amount of time.20 7 The Ninth Circuit emphasized a focus on subjective
198. Id. (citing Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Application
of Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Utah 1993); E. M. Clive, The Concept of Habitual
Residence, 1997 JURID. REv. 137, 144-45).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1077. The Ninth Circuit considered the other two broad categories of Child
Abduction Convention cases much easier to decide. In the first category, where a family is
deemed to have "jointly taken all the steps associated with abandoning habitual residence in
one country to take it up in another," a shared intent to move is usually found. Id. at 1076-
77. In the second category, where a child is allowed by one parent to abandon an established
habitual residence in favor of another for a specified time period, courts rarely find that a
child's habitual residence has changed based on a change in a parent's intent. Id. at 1077.
201. Id. at 1076.
202. Id. at 1078.
203. Id.
204. Id. The court determined that, given enough time, a child may become acclimatized
to the new country so that habitual residence may be established despite parental intent to
the contrary. Id.
205. Id. at 1078-79.
206. Id. at 1079; see also Silberman, supra note 22, at 1065 ("Requiring a clear showing
that a 'new' residence has been acquired reduces the ease with which habitual residence may
be shifted ... ").
207. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1079.
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intent and discouraged reliance on objective facts, except where they
"point unequivocally to a person's ordinary or habitual residence being in
a particular place."' 20 8  It concluded that, absent parental intent, courts
should be slow to infer from objective evidence that an earlier habitual
residence has been abandoned. 20 9
The Ninth Circuit then applied its newly articulated standard to the facts.
It held that, in order to infer a shared intent to abandon a previous habitual
residence, the agreement between the parents and the circumstances
surrounding it must be clear on the matter.210 However, the record lacked a
sufficient showing of shared parental intent to abandon Israel as the
children's habitual residence. 211 While the objective evidence showed that
the children had spent a "very full year" in Los Angeles, it did not
unequivocally show that Israel had ceased to be the children's habitual
residence.212 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had given
insufficient weight to the importance of shared parental intent and deemed
the appropriate inquiry to be "whether the United States had supplanted
Israel as the locus of the children's family and social development. '213
3. The Other Circuits Apply the Feder and Mozes Standards
The body of case law surrounding the concept of habitual residence grew
exponentially in the years between the Third Circuit's decision in Feder
and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mozes and has grown even more in
subsequent years. 214 Nearly every circuit to consider the issue of habitual
residence has incorporated, in some fashion, the parents' shared intention as
a factor for analysis.215
In 2003, the Eighth Circuit considered the issue of habitual residence in
Silverman v. Silverman. The Silverman family moved from Minnesota to
Israel in 1999 with their seven-year-old son, Sam, and four-year-old son,
Jacob. 216 After a strained year in Israel, Julie Silverman returned to the
United States with the boys under the pretense of a two-month summer
208. Id. at 1081 (quoting Zenel v. Haddow [1993] S.C. 612, 617 (Scot.)).
209. Id. at 1079; see also Silberman, supra note 22, at 1065 (discussing the Third
Circuit's opinion that, "in these international parental abduction cases, courts should be slow
to infer that an earlier habitual residence had been abandoned").
210. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081.
211. Id. at 1083.
212. Id. (quoting Mozes v. Mozes, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1998)); see also
infra app.
213. Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1084. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California for consideration of this issue. Id.
214. See Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The
Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 275, 276-77 (2002) (discussing the three
hundred percent increase in decisions released from 1993 to 2001).
215. See, e.g., Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that "virtually
every circuit court to consider the issue of habitual residence since Mozes has adopted some
variation of its approach" and finding "no reason to disavow the Mozes approach").
216. Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2008).
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vacation. 217  In late 2000, Robert Silverman filed Child Abduction
Convention petitions in an Israeli court and in the district court in
Minnesota.218 The Israeli court ruled that Israel was the boys' habitual
residence; in contrast, the district court ruled that Minnesota was the boys'
habitual residence. 219  The Eighth Circuit looked to the rulings of
Friedrich, Feder, and Mozes in considering the issue of the boys' habitual
residence. 220 Reversing the district court's ruling and finding that the boys'
habitual residence was israel, the Eighth Circuit emphasized
the degree of settled purpose from the children's perspective, including
the family's change in geography along with their personal possessions
and pets, the passage of time, the family abandoning its prior residence
and selling the house, the application for and securing of benefits only
available to Israeli immigrants, the children's enrollment in school, and,
to some degree, both parents' intentions at the time of the move to
Israel. 221
The dissent found this result unsatisfying and inconsistent with the holding
of Mozes.222 Emphasizing that it is the parents' shared intent that must be
considered, Judge Gerald Heaney agreed with the district court's
determination that the Silvermans did not have a shared intention to
abandon Minnesota for Israel.223
Just over a year later, the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of
habitual residence in Ruiz v. Tenorio.224 Melissa Tenorio and Juan Tenorio
Ruiz met in 1992 while Melissa was an exchange student in Mexico. 225
Melissa returned to Minnesota and their first son, Juanito, was born in
December 1992.226 Juan joined Melissa in Minnesota after he graduated
high school; they subsequently married, and their second son, Javier, was
born in 1998.227 The couple moved to Mexico in August 2000 so that Juan
could work for his family business.228  Tensions developed between
Melissa and her in-laws that further exacerbated her already strained
marriage, and, on May 20, 2003, Melissa took the boys to Florida without
any intention of returning to Mexico. 229 Juan filed a petition under the
Child Abduction Convention in a Florida federal district court on July 29,
2003.230 In considering the issue of Juanito and Javier's habitual residence,
217. Id. at 890.
218. Id. at 891.
219. Id. at 891-93; see also Silverman v. Silverman, No. CIV. 00-2274, 2002 WL
971808, at *4, *6 (D. Minn. May 9, 2002).
220. Id. at 898-99.
221. Id. (footnote omitted); see also infra app.
222. Silverman, 338 F.3d at 902 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 905-06.
224. 392 F.3d 1247 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
225. Id. at 1249.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1249-50.
230. Id. at 1250.
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the Eleventh Circuit found the Mozes approach to be the most
appropriate. 231 Thus, the first step in its analysis was to determine the
parents' shared intentions.232 The Eleventh Circuit found that this case fell
in the most difficult of the Mozes categories 233 and that Juan had failed to
show that he and Melissa had had a shared intention to abandon the United
States as the children's habitual residence. 234 However, the court then
looked at the objective facts of the case, since "the absence of a shared and
settled intention by the parents to abandon the previous United States
habitual residence of the children is not dispositive." 235  Although the
Eleventh Circuit recognized that there was evidence that the children had
acclimatized during their nearly three years in Mexico, the court also found
evidence that the move to Mexico was conditional. 236 Ultimately, the
Eleventh Circuit determined the objective facts to be insufficient to show
that the children's habitual residence had ever ceased being the United
States and that a new habitual residence in Mexico had been established.237
In 2005, the Second Circuit added to the rapidly developing body of case
law when it decided Gitter v. Gitter.238 Miriam, an Israeli-born American
citizen, and Yoshi, an Israeli citizen, met and married in 1999; their son,
Eden, was born in December 2000.239 Shortly after Eden's birth, Yoshi
proposed moving to Israel; the family moved in March 2001.240 Eleven
months after their move, Miriam returned to New York with Eden to visit
her sister; when Yoshi joined them, she expressed her desire to remain in
the United States.241 Yoshi convinced her to return to Israel for a short
time, but on June 30, 2002, Miriam permanently returned to the United
States with Eden.242 Yoshi filed a petition under the Child Abduction
Convention in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
in July 2003.243 In determining the issue of Eden's habitual residence, the
Second Circuit found the Ninth Circuit's holding in Mozes particularly
instructive. 244 The court found that "[f]ocusing on intentions gives contour
to the objective, factual circumstances surrounding the child's presence in a
231. Id. at 1252.
232. Id. at 1252-53.
233. See id. at 1254 (citing Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2001)); supra
note 200 and accompanying text.
234. Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1254; see also Silberman, supra note 22, at 1066 (discussing the
district court's findings that Melissa had moved to Mexico as a "trial period" to save her
marriage and that Juan had had second thoughts about moving).
235. Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255; see also infra app.
236. Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1255.
237. Id. at 1256; see also Silberman, supra note 22, at 1066 (highlighting the Eleventh
Circuit's greater emphasis on the intentions of the parties).
238. 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005).
239. Id. at 128.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 128-29.
242. Id. at 129.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 131 (remarking that the "primary insight of Mozes is its recognition of the
importance of intentions (normally the shared intentions of the parents or others entitled to
fix the child's residence) in determining a child's habitual residence").
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given location." 245 The Second Circuit advocated looking at the parents'
intentions at the last time their intentions were shared.246 In a perfunctory
application of its standard to the facts of the case, the Second Circuit
determined simply that there was no settled mutual intent to abandon the
United States in favor of Israel as Eden's habitual residence. 247
B. The Sixth Circuit Approach: Objective Evidence
As two of the earliest and most comprehensive opinions on the issue of
habitual residence, the Third Circuit's holding in Feder and the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Mozes have been extremely influential for other circuits
faced with Child Abduction Convention proceedings. 248  The Sixth
Circuit's decision in Friedrich, with its resolute insistence against relying
on shared parental intent, had been forgotten. 249 Yet six years after Mozes,
the Sixth Circuit was again presented with a habitual residence
determination. 250 Rather than follow the Third and Ninth Circuits, the
Sixth Circuit persisted in its view and was the first circuit to challenge the
propriety of considering shared parental intent in determining a child's
habitual residence. 251
1. Robert v. Tesson
The basic facts of Robert are quite similar to those of Feder and Mozes.
Ivan Robert and Gayle Tesson met in Houston, Texas, in 1994 and married
two years later.252 They had twin boys, Thomas and Alexis, in 1997, and
resided in the Houston area. 253 In 1998, the couple formed a French
company and purchased property in France. 254 From 1998 until 2003,
when Gayle and the twins left France for the United States, the family split
their time between the two countries. 255 In 2005, Ivan commenced an
action pursuant to the Child Abduction Convention and ICARA alleging
that Gayle had wrongfully removed the twins from France.256
245. Id. at 132.
246. Id. at 133; see also Carshae DeAnn Davis, Note, The Gitter Standard: Creating a
Uniform Definition of Habitual Residence Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 328 (2006) (finding that the Second
Circuit's inquiry into the parents' shared intentions was a means of satisfying the intent
requirement of Mozes).
247. Gitter, 396 F.3d at 135-36; see also infra app. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the facts were
sufficient for a finding that Israel was Eden Gitter's habitual residence. Gitter, 396 F.3d at
136.
248. See supra Part II.A.3.
249. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
250. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 2007).
251. Id. at 998 (recognizing that the holding "places [the Sixth Circuit] at odds with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Mozes").
252. Id. at 984.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 984-86.
256. Id. at987.
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While nearly every other circuit had to consider the issue of habitual
residence as a matter of first impression, the Sixth Circuit had Friedrich as
precedent.257  The Sixth Circuit relied on Friedrich's five guiding
principles. 258 First, courts should focus on the facts and circumstances of
each case, rather than rely on technical rules; second, courts should refrain
from considering anything other than the child's experiences; third, the
inquiry should be limited to the child's past experiences; fourth, a person
can have only one habitual residence at any time; and fifth, the nationality
of the child's caregiver is not indicative of the child's habitual residence. 259
The Sixth Circuit went on to analyze the decisions of other circuits,
particularly the Third and Ninth Circuits, and found that they had parted
ways with Friedrich by including the parents' subjective intent as an
additional factor for consideration. 260 The court was especially critical of
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mozes, finding that it was not only
inconsistent with Friedrich, but "'made seemingly easy cases hard and
reached results that are questionable at best."'' 261 For the Sixth Circuit, this
was exemplified in the Eleventh Circuit's application of the Mozes standard
in Ruiz. 262 Despite the objective factual evidence showing that the children
had established a new habitual residence in Mexico, the Eleventh Circuit
had found that the evidence was outweighed by the lack of shared parental
intent to abandon the United States as the children's habitual residence. 263
The Sixth Circuit criticized this standard as running counter to the Child
Abduction Convention's goal of preventing the removal of a child from the
environment in which his or her life has developed. 264 The Sixth Circuit
found that the Mozes standard allowed children to be returned to their
previous habitual residences simply because one parent voiced reservations
about the move to a new habitual residence and declined to follow such a
rule. 265 The Sixth Circuit was, however, receptive to part of the Third
Circuit's reasoning in Feder.266 Recognizing the goals of the Child
Abduction Convention, the influence of the Feder test, and its own
257. Id. at 988 ("[O]ur inquiry must begin with our sole precedent on this issue."). But
see, e.g., Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001) ("In a case of first
impression in our court, we interpret the term 'habitual residence' in the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.").
258. Robert, 507 F.3d at 989.
259. Id. (citing Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich 1), 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993);
In re Bates, (1989) CA 122/89, slip op. (High Ct. of Justice, Fain. Div., Royal Cts. of
Justice), http://www.hiltonhouse.com/cases/Bates-uk.txt); see also supra Part I.E; infra
notes 275-87 and accompanying text.
260. Robert, 507 F.3d at 989; see also supra Part II.A. 1-2.
261. Robert, 507 F.3d at 991 (quoting Koch v. Koch, 416 F. Supp. 2d 645, 651 (E.D.
Wis. 2006)).
262. Id.; Ruiz v. Tenorio, 392 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 224-37
and accompanying text.
263. Robert, 507 F.3d at 991; Ruiz, 392 F.3d at 1254; see also supra notes 232-37 and
accompanying text.
264. Robert, 507 F.3d at 991 (quoting Prez- Vera Report, supra note 36, at 429).
265. Id. at 991-92.
266. Id. at 992-93 (finding that "not all post-Friedrich I developments should be
rejected"); see also supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
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precedent, the Sixth Circuit held that "a child's habitual residence is the
nation where, at the time of their removal, the child has been present long
enough to allow acclimatization, and where this presence has a 'degree of
settled purpose from the child's perspective.' ' 267
The Sixth Circuit applied its standard to the facts before it and found that,
while many of the facts "cut in both directions," the evidence demonstrated
that the boys were habitual residents of the United States at the time they
were removed from France by their mother.268 The Sixth Circuit noted
that, during their time in the United States, Thomas and Alexis attended
American schools, developed meaningful relationships with their maternal
relatives, and went on vacations to Yellowstone National Park and Baton
Rouge.269 This contrasted sharply with their experiences in France.270
While in France, Thomas and Alexis had barely any contact with their
father or their other paternal relatives and their "home," Mas Verdoline,
was in no condition for children to live. 271
C. The Foreign Courts Weigh In: A Brief Survey
As discussed earlier in this Note, one of the Child Abduction
Convention's goals is uniform interpretation and application of its text
worldwide. 272 Both the Vienna Convention and the Supreme Court have
advocated considering the decisions of the United States' sister signatories
as a method of attaining this goal. 273 However, American courts have
selectively referenced only a few foreign cases in their opinions, almost
exclusively from Britain and other common-law countries. 274 Given the
importance of uniform interpretation of the Child Abduction Convention,
this part seeks to provide a complete examination of the habitual residence
determination by surveying Child Abduction Convention cases from both
common-law and civil-law countries. Part II.C. 1 considers cases from
common-law countries whose courts, like the Third and Ninth Circuits,
advocate, to differing extents, some reliance on subjective intent when
determining a child's habitual residence. Part II.C.2 considers cases from
267. Id. at 993 (quoting Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995))
(describing this standard as consistent with the goal of the Child Abduction Convention to
protect the rights of children not to have their lives altered absent a guarantee of stability in a
new environment and with the holding of Friedrich that "a habitual residence inquiry must
'focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions'
(quoting Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich 1), 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993))).
268. Id. at 996; see also infra app.
269. Robert, 507 F.3d at 996-97; see also infra app.
270. Robert, 507 F.3d at 997; see also infra app.
271. Robert, 507 F.3d at 997.
272. See supra Part I.B. I.
273. See supra Part I.D.
274. See, e.g., Robert, 507 F.3d at 989 (citing In re Bates, (1989) CA 122/89, slip op.
(High Ct. of Justice, Fam. Div., Royal Cts. of Justice) (U.K.),
http://www.hiltonhouse.com/cases/Bates-uk.txt); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1074,
1081 (9th Cir. 2001); see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 236 (noting that
courts in the United States have chosen, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court in Air France v. Saks, to consult foreign case law).
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civil-law countries, whose courts, like the Sixth Circuit, generally advocate
limiting the habitual residence determination to the objective facts
presented.
1. Common-Law Subjectivity
One of the most cited common-law cases in both the United States and
other common-law countries is the British case, In re Bates.275 Decided in
1989, Bates was one of the earliest cases to consider the issue of habitual
residence under the Child Abduction Convention. Tatjana, born in 1986,
was the only daughter of an American mother and British father who were
married in 1984.276 Because of the father's success as a pop musician, the
family travelled constantly and Tatjana was left mostly to the care of
nannies. 277  Despite an earlier disagreement over where the mother,
Tatjana, and Tatjana's nanny would remain while the father embarked on
his most recent world tour, it was decided that they would remain in New
York. 278 Soon after the father's departure, Tatjana's mother, desiring to
devote more time to Tatjana's day-to-day care, gave her nanny the weekend
off.2 7 9 Finding this to be a threat to Tatjana's father's arrangements, the
nanny contacted him and was instructed to take Tatjana to London
immediately.280  Tatjana's mother immediately contacted both the
American and British central authorities and filed simultaneous Child
Abduction Convention petitions in American and British courts.281
In his opinion, Justice John Waite relied heavily on two sources of
British law: Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws and Lord Scarman's
opinion in Regina v. Barnet London Borough Council.282 Justice Waite
recognized that habitual residence was intended by the Child Abduction
Convention drafters to be a concept separate from domicile and that courts
should avoid creating detailed and restrictive rules that would transform it
into a technical term of art.283 Justice Waite then adopted the principle of
"settled purpose" from Lord Scarman's opinion in Regina:
275. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 236 (discussing the fact that Bates
is the starting point for many courts considering habitual residence, as well as the fact that,
despite English and Scottish reluctance to rely on foreign case law, courts in Australia and
New Zealand have made extensive use of such decisions, particularly those from England).
276. In re Bates, (1989) CA 122/89 (High Ct. of Justice, Fam. Div., Royal Cts. of
Justice).
277. Id.
278. Id. Tatjana's father wanted them to wait for him in their London home, whereas
Tatjana's mother wished to remain in New York. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. Tatjana Bates's father felt that the nanny was "essential to look after his interest,
to maintain surveillance and to report back to him. He told [the nanny] privately that if the
mother was... 'mean' to her, she was to report to him straight away." Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (citing Regina v. Bamet London Borough Council, [1983] 2 A.C. 309, 343 (H.L.
1982) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); A. V. DICEY & J. H. C. MORRIS, I DICEY & MORIS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 7 (Lawrence Collins ed., 11 th ed. 1987)).
283. Id. (quoting DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 282, at 167).
2009] 3355
FORDHAMLA WREVIEW
[T]here must be a degree of settled purpose. The purpose may be one or
there may be several. It may be specific or general. All that the law
requires is that there is a settled purpose. That is not to say that the
propositus intends to stay where he is indefinitely. Indeed his purpose
while settled may be for a limited period. Education, business or
profession, employment, health, family or merely love of the place spring
to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular abode, and there may
well be many others. All that is necessary is that the purpose of living
where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly
described as settled. 284
He determined that, while it is the child's habitual residence that must be
determined, when a child is as young as Tatjana the "overtly stated
intentions" of the child's parents are bound to be important factors and must
be included.285 In applying these principles to the facts before him, Justice
Waite determined that the New York apartment was intended to be a
temporary base, but that it had acquired a more settled purpose by the time
the family moved in, evidenced by the arrangements made for Tatjana's
care, accommodations, and speech therapy. 286 Justice Waite concluded that
New York was Tatjana's habitual residence and her removal to London was
wrongful under the Child Abduction Convention. 287 Every subsequent
Child Abduction Convention case that has come before a British court has
been determined according to the principles laid out in Bates.2 88
Relying on British case law, courts in other common-law countries have
come to similar conclusions in considering habitual residence. One such
example is the 1990 Scottish case, Dickson v. Dickson.289 Penny and James
Dickson married in 1987, and their only son was born in 1988.290 A year
after their child's birth, the family left Scotland for Australia.29 1 After only
a few discontented months in Australia, James returned to England with
their son. 292 The parties disputed whether this return was intended to be a
vacation or permanent. 293 Regardless, Penny waited another three months
284. Id. (quoting Regina, [1983] 2 A.C. at 344). It must be noted, first, that Regina v.
Barnet London Borough Council was not a Child Abduction Convention case, but rather a
case deciding the "ordinary residence" of immigrants with respect to the British Education
Act, and, second, that Lord Leslie Scarman equated the concept of habitual residence with
"ordinary residence," a development that has been subject to great criticism. See BEAUMONT
& MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 101 n.81; see also supra notes 108-10 and accompanying
text.
285. Bates, (1989) CA 122/89.
286. Id.; see also infra app.
287. Bates, (1989) CA 122/89.
288. See, e.g., B v. H, [2002] 1 F.L.R. 388 (Fam.) (U.K.); In re J, [1990] 2 A.C. 562
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), affd sub nom. C v. S, [1990] 2 All E.R. 961 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
289. [1990] Sc. L.R. 692 (Sess.) (Scot.).
290. Id. at 693.
291. Id.
292. Id. Afier spending some time at his sister's home in England, James Dickson
returned with the child to Scotland. Id.
293. Id. at 694-96.
3356 [Vol. 77
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES
before claiming that James had wrongfully removed their son.294 The court
determined that habitual residence "implied residence over an extended
period and settled in quality." 295 However, since a two-year-old child is
unable to form his or her own intention about residence in the same way an
adult can, only the child's parents can decide his or her residence.296 The
court ultimately concluded that when the child left Australia it was James's
intention that they never return and, until Penny filed her claim, both
parents expected the child to make his home in the United Kingdom, and "it
could not be said that the child resided in Australia." 297
In Cooper v. Casey,298 the Family Court of Australia came to a similar
conclusion on the issue of habitual residence. The parents of B and H
married in September 1988; B and H were both born in Australia.299
Shortly after B's birth in 1989, the family left Australia for the United
States and made frequent trips back to Australia over the next five years. 300
In 1993, the wife, with her husband's consent, left for France with B and H
and purchased a home there. 301 She eventually returned to the United
States with the children in February 1994.302 However, she remained there
only six months before leaving for Australia with the children.303 In
considering the issue of B and H's habitual residence, the court looked to a
combination of American and British case law.304 The court recognized the
principles laid out by Justice Waite in In re B:305 first, that a young child's
habitual residence is the same as that of his or her parents and neither parent
can unilaterally change it without the other parent's consent, and second,
that the habitual residence of a married couple is the county that the couple
has voluntarily adopted for settled purposes as part of their regular lives.306
Perfunctorily addressing the issue, the court merely affirmed the lower
court's determination that, having settled in the United States after their
return from France in 1984, B and H's habitual residence had never ceased
to be the United States.30 7
294. Id. at 693.
295. Id. at 699 (quoting Kapur v. Kapur, [1984] F.L.R. 920, 926 (Fam.) (U.K.)); see also
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 101 ("[T]he Lord President stated that a habitual
residence was: '... . one which is being enjoyed voluntarily for the time being and with the
settled intention that it should continue for some time."' (quoting Dickson [1990] Sc. L.R. at
703)).
296. Dickson [ 1990] Sc. L.R. at 699.
297. Id. at 699-700; see also infra app. The court made no distinction between England
and Scotland, finding the United Kingdom the child's habitual residence. Dickson [1990] Sc.
L.R. at 699-700.
298. (1995) 18 Fam. L.R. 433 (Austl.).
299. Id. at 434.
300. Id. H was born on one of those visits to Australia. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 435-36 (citing Friedrich v. Friedrich (Friedrich 1), 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th
Cir. 1993); In re B, [1993] 1 F.L.R. 993 (Fam.) (U.K.)).
305. [1993] 1 F.L.R. 993.
306. Cooper, (1995) 18 Fam. L.R. at 435-36 (quoting In re B, [1993] 1 F.L.R. at 995).
307. Id.; see also infra app.
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2. Civil-Law Objectivity
Like their common-law counterparts, courts in civil-law countries have
been called upon to consider the issue of habitual residence under the Child
Abduction Convention. Civil-law courts have distinguished themselves
from common-law courts by refusing to rely on subjective intent when
determining a child's habitual residence. Despite the availability of civil-
law opinions, few common-law courts have chosen to look to these courts
for guidance. If uniformity in interpretation is to be achieved, there is no
reason to prefer common-law cases over civil-law cases as a source of
guidance.
In 1995, the Argentine Supreme Court of Justice was presented with a
Child Abduction Convention case in Wilner v. Osswald.30 8 Eduardo Wilner
and Maria Osswald married in Buenos Aires in 1985 and a few months later
left for Canada, where Eduardo was to study at a university. 30 9 Their
daughter was born in Ontario in February 1990.310 The family remained in
Canada until 1993, when Maria decided to return to Buenos Aires with their
daughter to spend the holidays with her family. 311 It was not until the
passage of the new year that Eduardo realized that Maria had decided to
remain in Argentina with their daughter.312 Eduardo then petitioned for his
daughter's return under the Child Abduction Convention. 313 In determining
what the daughter's habitual residence was, Argentina's highest court
succinctly stated that "[t]he term 'habitual residence' as used in the [Child
Abduction] Convention refers to a factual situation that implies stability and
permanence and alludes to the center of the minor's life, excluding any
reference to minors' depending domicile." 314 The court concluded that any
interpretation that made a child's habitual residence dependent on the
parents' domicile is mistaken.315 Based on the fact that the child had
developed her life in Ontario, which was where her family was and where
308. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [Supreme Court of Justice],
14/6/1995, "Wilner, Eduardo Mario v. Osswald, Maria Gabriela / recurso de hecho,"
Colecci6n Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [Fallos] (1995-318-
1269) (Arg.), translated and available at http://web.archive.org/web/20070526143121/
http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0362.htm.
309. Id. at 1281-82.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1285; see also Juzgado de Primera Instancia [la Inst.] [Buenos Aires National
Court of First Instance], 05/10/2001, "Aisemberg de Altheim, Andrea F. v. Altheim, Flavio
David," (Arg.), translated and available . at
http://hiltonhouse.com/cases/AltheimArgentina.txt ("[Habitual residence] therefore
signifies the place where the minor carries out his activities, where he has been established
with a certain degree of permanence, the centre of his emotional and daily experiences...
the expression 'habitual residence' refers to a factual situation that assumes stability and
permanence.").
315. Wilner, Fallos (1995-318) at 1285. Implicit in the court's rejection of the parents'
domicile as a factor in determining habitual residence is a rejection of the parents' subjective
intention. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
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she attended kindergarten, the court determined that her habitual residence
was Canada.316
In 1996, the Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden faced a similar
determination in Johnson v. Johnson.317 Anne and Thomas were married in
1986, and Amanda, their only daughter, was born in 1987.318 In 1990, the
family moved from Switzerland to the United States, where Anne was
posted to the Swedish Consulate in New York and Thomas was posted in
Washington, D.C.; Amanda lived alternately with her mother and father.319
In 1992, Anne and Thomas divorced and agreed that Amanda would spend
twenty-eight weeks with her mother and twenty-four weeks with her father
until July 1, 1993, when Anne would return to Sweden with Amanda.320
Amanda would then alternate between her parents every two years. 321 Prior
to the date when Amanda was to return to Thomas in the United States, he
filed a petition for her return under the Child Abduction Convention in a
Swedish court.322 In determining Amanda's habitual residence, the court
found that habitual residence is where there is constancy with regard to the
duration of the period concerned, among other factors. 323 Such an analysis
must take into account all the circumstances that can be objectively
observed to show a permanent attachment to one country over another,
including the child's existing social ties.324 In analyzing the objective facts,
the court noted that Amanda had been staying with Anne in Sweden for
more than two years prior to Thomas's petition and that the record showed
that she had adjusted to her circumstances there.325  In addition, the
agreement between the parties stipulated that Amanda was to spend eight
years in Sweden with Anne prior to reaching the age of eighteen, whereas
she was to spend only four years in the United States with Thomas. 326
While Amanda had remained in Sweden against Thomas's will since
August 1995, the date when physical custody was to switch, the retention
was not wrongful because Sweden was Amanda's habitual residence. 327
Rochford v. Rochford328 presented the Juvenile Court of Rome with a
habitual residence issue to consider in 1999. Luca was born in London on
316. Wilner, Fallos (1995-318) at 1285; see also infra app.
317. Regeringsratten [RegR] [Supreme Administrative Court] 1996-05-09 (Swed.),
translated and available at http://www.hiltonhouse.com/cases/Johnson 002_Sweden.txt.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.; see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 35, at 100 (discussing the parties'
shuttle agreement, confirmed by the Alexandria Circuit Court in Virginia, whereby Amanda
would alternate between Sweden and the United States).
322. Johnson, [RegR] 1996-05-09.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.; see also infra app.
326. Johnson, [RegR] 1996-05-09.
327. Id.
328. Juvenile Court of Rome, 07 jan. 1999, n.2450/98 E (Italy), translated and available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20050817001 646/http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase
/0297.htm.
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August 5, 1993, to Nicholas, a British citizen, and Pasqualina, an Italian-
British citizen. 329 The family lived together in England until Nicholas and
Pasqualina separated and Pasqualina moved to Italy.330 Luca remained
exclusively in England, with the exception of a visit to his mother from
September to December 1997, until Pasqualina removed him to Italy in
May 1998.331 In determining Luca's habitual residence, the court relied
solely on the objective facts of the case. The court found that, except for
his trip to Italy, Luca had lived in England all his life and that the trip was
for so short a duration that it could not serve to change his habitual
residence. 332 Only a place that is the center of the child's life and can be
shown to be where the child usually spends most of his or her time can be
considered the child's habitual residence.333 The court found that Luca's
habitual residence was unequivocally England. 334
III. RESOLVING THE DEBATE: COURTS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM
INCORPORATING SUBJECTIVE INTENTIONS INTO THE HABITUAL RESIDENCE
DETERMINATION
This Note has detailed the split between the U.S. circuits and among
courts worldwide over what factors should be considered when determining
a child's habitual residence. In the absence of any guidance from the text
of the Child Abduction Convention, the circuits have developed differing
standards based on divergent interpretations of what evidences a "degree of
settled purpose." 335 The Third and Ninth Circuits have chosen to focus the
analysis on the subjective intent of those charged with the child's care,
usually the parents. 336 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has limited its analysis
to the objective facts of the case, finding this to be more in line with the
Child Abduction Convention's goal of maintaining the status quo. 337 This
division is also evident between courts in common-law and civil-law
countries. Common-law courts, which the Ninth Circuit in particular has
looked to for guidance, have, despite their best efforts, conflated the
concepts of habitual residence and domicile. 338 As a result, common-law
courts also advocate the incorporation of subjective intent into the habitual
residence determination. Civil-law courts have exercised more restraint in
limiting their analyses to objective facts.339 This Note proposes that courts
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. Pasqualina Rochford argued that she intended to take Luca Rochford
permanently to Italy when she left London in September 1997 and that Nicholas Rochford
wrongfully retained Luca in London at the end of the Christmas holidays. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. The court further noted that Luca did not even speak Italian when he arrived in
Italy in September 1997. Id.; see also infra app.
334. Rochford, Juvenile Court of Rome, n.2450/98 E.
335. See supra notes 172-74, 191-94 and accompanying text.
336. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
337. See supra Part 1I.B.1.
338. See supra Part II.C.1.
339. See supra Part II.C.2.
[Vol. 773360
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES
in the United States, and indeed worldwide, should adopt the Robert
standard and determine habitual residence solely on objective evidence of
acclimatization. The Sixth Circuit's analysis best accomplishes the goals of
the Child Abduction Convention's drafters and provides the certainty and
consistency that the resolution of international child abduction cases
requires.
Part III.A evaluates the standards advocated by the circuits as discussed
in Part II by applying them to the facts of Sorenson. Part III.B proposes
that the Robert standard is the better standard to apply in determining a
child's habitual residence in order to remain faithful to the Child Abduction
Convention's text and purpose.
A. Evaluating the Application of the Circuits' Standards to the Facts of
Sorenson v. Sorenson
When the federal district court in Minnesota decided Sorenson, it was
bound by the precedent laid out by the Eighth Circuit in Silverman, which
in turn relied wholly on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Mozes.340 The
district court thus looked first at the parents' shared subjective intentions
and then to the objective evidence of E. S. S.'s acclimatization. 341 The
district court found that the Sorensons' shared intent was to make Australia
E. S. S.'s habitual residence and that they had no definite intention to return
to the United States.342 The district court found support for its conclusion
in a number of objective facts, but gave "strong weight to these objective
indications" simply because they substantiated the court's conclusion of the
parents' intent. 343
If the district court had applied the standard articulated in Robert-
focusing the habitual residence determination solely on objective evidence
of acclimatization-to the facts of Sorenson, it is probable that the court
would have reached the same ultimate conclusion without the time-
consuming inquiry into parental intent. The district court applying the
Robert standard would have found that E. S. S. had lived in Australia for
approximately three out of the five years of her life, but had lived in the
United States for only fourteen months; that E. S. S. spoke English with an
Australian accent because she had learned to speak English exclusively in
Australia; that E. S. S. had enrolled in preschool in Australia; and that E. S. S.'s
friends were all in Australia.344 These objective facts clearly show that
E. S. S.'s habitual residence was Australia. 345
Although in this instance both standards yield the same result, if the
district court had determined instead that the Sorensons' shared intent was
to keep the United States as E. S. S.'s habitual residence, despite their
340. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
342. See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 (D. Minn. 2008).
343. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
344. See Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 970; see also infra app.
345. See Sorenson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
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temporary relocation to Australia, or that Eric had always shown an
intention to return to the United States, the outcome could have been vastly
different. Under the Robert standard, the objective evidence of
acclimatization would still point toward Australia as being E. S. S.'s
habitual residence at the time she was retained by Janea. In contrast, the
Feder and Mozes standards place a greater emphasis on the parents'
subjective intentions. The Feder standard requires an analysis of the child's
"circumstances" in tandem with an emphasis on the parents' shared
subjective intent; 346 the Mozes standard focuses much more heavily on the
parents' shared subjective intentions, turning to objective evidence only
reluctantly in extreme cases. 34 7 If there had been any evidence that the
Sorensons' shared intention had been to return to the United States, under
either the Feder or Mozes standard, the district court would likely have
found E. S. S.'s habitual residence to be America. 348 Regardless of how
definitive the objective evidence may seem, a conclusion that the parents'
shared intent was for the family's habitual residence to remain the United
States or that the parents in fact lacked a shared intent would have rendered
the objective facts irrelevant, unless, of course, it was "unequivocal" in the
court's eyes. 349
B. Why Courts Should Follow the Robert Standard
This Note's application of the Feder and Mozes standards to the facts of
Sorenson shows the confusion and uncertainty that result when shared
subjective intent is incorporated into the habitual residence analysis. 350
Such an analysis allows courts to revert to considerations akin to the "best
interests" inquiry of traditional child custody proceedings and results in
illogical determinations of habitual residence. Given the very specific goals
of the Child Abduction Convention's drafters and the discussions that
surrounded the convention's drafting, this Note advocates adherence to a
standard that considers only objective evidence of settled purpose and
acclimatization when determining a child's habitual residence. Despite the
best efforts of the Third and Ninth Circuits and common-law courts to make
habitual residence determinations in accordance with the spirit of the Child
Abduction Convention, their reliance on subjective intentions as a decisive
factor has a number of fatal flaws.
Although all the circuits agree that there must be evidence of a degree of
settled purpose in order for a country to be deemed a child's habitual
346. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 190, 195-98, 204-09 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Part H.A.
349. See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text. Since the Sorensons had kept a few
vestiges of their previous life with family in Minnesota and maintained a joint Minnesota
bank account, a court following Mazes v. Mozes would be highly unwilling to find the
remainder of the objective evidence "unequivocal."
350. See supra Part ll.A; see also supra text accompanying notes 216-23 (describing
how the Eight Circuit, applying the same Mozes standard, disagreed on Sam and Jacob's
habitual residence).
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residence, 351 the resulting divergence in standards originates in a difference
in opinion as to what constitutes "settled purpose." For the Third Circuit,
there can be no settled purpose without evidence of a shared parental intent
to acquire a new habitual residence. 352 The Ninth Circuit goes so far as to
require a showing of shared parental intent to both abandon an old habitual
residence and to acquire new habitual residence, transforming evidence of
settled purpose into an evidence akin to a showing of domicile. 353 The
Sixth Circuit has articulated the most restrained interpretation of settled
purpose, looking solely to objective evidence of acclimatization to show
that sufficient continuity in residences exists to be deemed settled.354
Focusing on shared parental intent is problematic given that the very
nature of Child Abduction Convention proceedings presumes that the
parents disagree as to where their child's habitual residence ought to be.355
It is axiomatic that, by the time a Child Abduction Convention proceeding
is started, there is no shared parental intent as to where a child should be
habitually resident. Thus, a standard such as that articulated in Mozes,
which emphasizes subjective intentions, encourages courts to engage in a
messy, two-step determination of (1) a hypothetical time in the recent past
when a shared intent between the parents existed and (2) what, in fact, that
intent was. 356 Such an inquiry into difficult-to-divine and amorphous
concepts is directly contrary to the summary-return mechanism
contemplated by the Child Abduction Convention's drafters.
Focusing on objective factors avoids contravention of the Child
Abduction Convention's drafters' goals. First and perhaps foremost, the
drafters never intended Child Abduction Convention proceedings to be
custody proceedings. 357 Rather, Child Abduction Convention proceedings
were intended to be administrative proceedings, and the merits of the case
were to be left to those better suited to determine the child's custody.358
The Third and Ninth Circuits' consideration of the parents' shared
subjective intent is motivated by a belief that children are easily
manipulated and that parents are best suited to provide evidence as to a
child's habitual residence. 359 This, in essence, forces upon the Child
Abduction Convention an analysis eerily similar to the best-interests
standard that the drafters made a concerted effort to avoid.360 In contrast,
351. See supra notes 172-73, 267 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 104-05, 191-94 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 260, 267 and accompanying text.
355. This is a difficulty that even the Ninth Circuit recognized in Mozes. See supra text
accompanying note 199.
356. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Report of the Special
Commission, supra note 72, at 178 ("[The Child Abduction Convention] does not settle, or
seek to settle, the question of custodial rights.").
358. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 197-98, 207 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 53-56, 61, 77-86 and accompanying text; see also Report of the
Special Commission, supra note 72, at 182-83.
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the Robert standard remains faithful to the drafters' goals of simplicity and
expediency that underlay their decision to make the Child Abduction
Convention a noncustodial proceeding. 361
In addition, the drafters desired uniformity in interpretation and
application of the Child Abduction Convention. 362 Clearly, the existing
conflict precludes the attainment of uniform interpretation, however, this
Note declines to advocate adherence to the Feder and Mozes standards for
the mere sake of conformity. Consideration of subjective intentions
encourages parents to forum shop for the court most willing to entertain
narratives of either hesitation in moving or the settled nature of the family's
life in a new country. 363 The drafters, in establishing a new mechanism for
handling international child abductions, deliberately sought to avoid such
exploitation of children. 364 To avoid weakening the Child Abduction
Convention, courts in the United States and worldwide should refrain from
focusing on parents' shared subjective intents.365
Interwoven with the Child Abduction Convention's drafters' goal of
uniformity is their goal of maintaining flexibility in the habitual residence
determination. 366 While upon first glance it would seem that any standard
to incorporate subjective intentions would be inherently more flexible,
nothing could be farther from the truth. When the Child Abduction
Convention drafters first contemplated a uniform mechanism for dealing
with international child abductions, they were responding to the rampant
inconsistencies that resulted from each country's different method for
resolving such cases. 367 The creation of a single overarching rule was
designed to eliminate each court's rigid adherence to its preferred method
of analysis, as well as the influence of national biases. 368 Thus, the drafters
were not concerned with flexibility in individual cases, but rather flexibility
in the overall application of the convention.
Settled purpose and, by extension, habitual residence does not require
proof of shared subjective intent, but rather objective evidence of
acclimatization that shows that a child has the type of attachments and
relationships to a country that would require restoration of the status quo.369
From the child's perspective, this can be shown through evidence of the
361. See supra notes 53-56, 61, 77-86 and accompanying text (describing the pitfalls of
the best-interests standard).
362. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 86, 265 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
365. See Weiner, supra note 214, at 279 (noting that lack of uniform interpretation might
weaken the Convention); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 111- 12 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 61, 80-81 and accompanying text.
369. See Dyer Report, supra note 44, at 21 (describing how children suffer from the
"sudden upsetting of [their] stability, the traumatic loss of contact with the parent who has
been in charge of [their] upbringing, the uncertainty and frustration which come with the
necessity to adapt to a strange language, unfamiliar cultural conditions and unknown
teachers and relatives"); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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child's enrollment in school, the primary language spoken by the child, the
quality and duration of the child's stay in a particular country, and the
relationships formed by the child with friends and relatives. 370 Where there
is insufficient objective evidence of settled purpose from the child's
perspective, the court may then turn to objective evidence of settled purpose
from the parents' perspective, such as permanence of occupation. 371 The
Robert standard's focus on objective factors best embodies the drafters'
understanding of habitual residence as a "purely factual concept, to be
differentiated especially from that of the 'domicile' ' 372 and best maintains
the flexibility the Child Abduction Convention's drafters envisioned. 373
CONCLUSION
In the decades since the Child Abduction Convention was adopted in
1980, courts worldwide have struggled with the issue of habitual residence.
As a result, a conflict has developed over whether courts should consider
only objective facts or include subjective intentions in the habitual
residence determination. Courts in the United States and worldwide must
apply the standard that best achieves the objectives of the Child Abduction
Convention's drafters. When the drafters met in the late 1970s to face the
growing problem of international child abductions, they were clear in their
goal of protecting children from the effects of wrongful removals and
retentions.374 Yet, they were equally adamant in their desire to construct a
text that would provide certainty, consistency, and expediency for all
parties involved, while at the same time maintaining a high degree of
flexibility.375 Courts such as the Third and Ninth Circuits have lost sight of
the drafters' intent. Any analysis that focuses on the shared subjective
intentions of parents is not only illogical, but rigid, inconsistent, and
wrought with uncertainty. Where a court is presented with a Child
Abduction Convention proceeding, it must act with restraint, focusing only
on the objective evidence, and avoid reverting to more comfortable
concepts, such as best interests. Only then will the Child Abduction
Convention's procedures be uniformly applied and its objectives
universally accomplished. 376
370. See, e.g., supra notes 268-71, 316, 325-26, 332-33 and accompanying text.
371. This may be the case where the child is too young to enroll in school or show
evidence of relationships, where there is insufficient evidence to show definitively that one
country is the child's habitual residence over another (the evidence "cuts both ways"), or
where the court feels strongly that the child's attachments have been manipulated by the
abducting parent. See, e.g., supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
372. Report of the Special Commission, supra note 72, at 189.
373. See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 77-85, 103-12 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 128.
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APPENDIX 377
[Vol. 77
Case Name; Facts of Cour's Shared Evidence of Evidence ofCa Retention/ Holding Parental Child's Parents'Removal Intention Acclimatization Acclimatization
Friedrich v. Removal Habitually N/A Born in Germany; N/A
Friedrich, 983 of 2-year- resident in lived exclusively
F.2d 1396 (6th old son by Germany; in Germany until
Cir. 1993) mother removal removal (almost 2
from wrongful years)
Germany
to the
United
States
Feder v. Evans- Removal Habitually Shared Born in Germany; Mrs. Feder
Feder, 63 F.3d of 4-year- resident in intention to lived in the United accepted a role
217 (3d Cir. old son by Australia; move to and States for 3 2 in the Australian
1995) mother removal remain in years; lived in Opera
from wrongful Australia Australia for 6 Company; Mr.
Australia indefinitely months (until Feder obtained
to the removal); attended an Australian
United an Australian license; both
States nursery school; completed
was enrolled in paperwork for
kindergarten permanent
residency;
bought and
renovated a
home; made
arrangements
for long-term
schooling
Mozes v. Retention Habitually No shared Born in Israel; N/A
Mozes, 239 of a 9- resident in intention to lived in Israel for
F.3d 1067 (9th year-old Israel at time abandon the majority of
Cir. 2001) and 5-year- of move; Israel in their lives; lived in
old twins remanded for favor of the the United States
by mother determination United for about 1 year;
in the of whether States enrolled and
United the United participated in
States States school full-time
supplanted and in social,
Israel as cultural, and
habitual religious activities;
residence learned English
377. Many thanks to Professor Thomas Lee for suggesting the use of a table to
summarize concisely the facts of the cases discussed in this Note.
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Facts of Shared Evidence of Evidence ofCase Name; Retention/ Court's Parental Child's Parents'Citation Reeto/ Holding
Removal Intention Acclimatization Acclimatization
Silverman v. Removal Habitually Shared Born in the United Sold U.S. home;
Silverman, 338 of 8-year- resident in intention to States; lived in the moved all
F.3d 886 (8th old and 5- Israel; move to United States for 7 possessions and
Cir. 2003) year-old removal Israel and 4 years, the family's pets
sons by wrongful permanently respectively; lived to Israel; mother
mother in Israel for about made Aliyah
from Israel I year; enrolled in (immigration) to
to the elementary school Israel in 1987;
United and preschool; father made
States participated in Aliyah just prior
extracurriculars; to the family's
learned Hebrew move
Ruiz v. Removal Habitually No shared Born in the United House was
Tenorio, 392 of 11 -year- resident in the intention to States; lived in the being built for
F.3d 1247 old and 5- United States; abandon the United States for 7 the family in
(1 th Cir. year-old removal not United and 2 /2 years, Mexico; no
2004) sons by wrongful States in respectively; lived belongings were
mother favor of in Mexico for left in the
from Mexico about 3 years; United States
Mexico to went to school;
the United had social
States engagements
Gitter v. Gitter, Removal Habitually No shared Born in the United U.S. bank
396 F.3d 124 of 2-year- resident in the intention to States; lived in the accounts closed;
(2d Cir. 2005) old son by United States abandon the United States for 3 cars sold;
mother at time of United months; lived in belongings put
from Israel move; States in Israel for nearly 2 in storage (then
to the remanded for favor of years sold or given
United determination Israel away); son
States of whether enrolled in day
Israel care
supplanted
the United
States as
habitual
residence
Robert v. Retention Habitually N/A Born in the United N/A
Tesson, 507 of 6-year- resident in the States; lived in the
F.3d 981 (6th old twins United States; United States a
Cir. 2007) by mother retention not total of 4 /2 years;
in the wrongful lived in France a
United total of less than 2
States years; formed
meaningful
relationships with
maternal relatives
while in the United
States, had scant
contact with
paternal relatives;
French home unfit
to live in
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Case Name; Facts of Court's Shared Evidence of Evidence ofCa Retention/ Holding Parental Child's Parents'Removal Intention Acclimatization Acclimatization
Sorenson v. Retention Habitually Shared Born in the United U.S. house and
Sorenson, 563 of 4-year- resident in intention to States; lived in the cars sold;
F. Supp. 2d old Australia; move to and United States for personal
961 (D. Minn. daughter retention not remain in 14 months; lived in belongings
2008) by mother wrongful Australia Australia for transported to
in indefinitely nearly 3 years; Australia;
Australia enrolled in an Minnesota
Australian residency
preschool; spoke surrendered and
with an Australian Australia
accent; friends claimed as
were in Australia residence for tax
purposes
In re Bates, Removal Habitually Shared Lived around the Arrangements
(1989) CA of 2 1- resident in the intention to world with her made for care
122/89, slip op. year-old United States; remain in parents because of and
(High Ct. of daughter removal the United father's job accommodations
Justice, Far. by nanny wrongful States for in N.Y.;
Div., Royal (on behalf the duration arrangements
Cts. of Justice) of father) of father's made for speech
(U.K.) from the tour therapy sessions
United in N.Y.
States to
England
Dickson v. Removal Habitually Shared Born in Scotland N/A
Dickson [1990] of infant resident in the intention and lived there for
Sc. L.R. 692 son by United that father about 1 year; lived
(Sess.) (Scot.) father from Kingdom; and son in Australia for
Australia removal not would leave about 6 months;
to the wrongful Australia lived in England
United for the for about 2 months
Kingdom United before petition was
Kingdom filed
Cooper v. Removal Habitually Shared Born in Australia; N/A
Casey, (1995) of 5-year- resident in the intention to lived in the United
18 Fam. L.R. old and 2- United States; make the States for a total of
433 (Austl.) year-old removal United more than 2 years;
sons by wrongful States the lived in Australia
mother children's for a total of about
from the permanent 1 year; neither
United home child had been to
States to Australia for
Australia nearly 2 years; 5-
year-old attended
preschool in the
United States
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Facts of Shared Evidence of Evidence ofCase Name; Retention/ Court's Parental Child's Parents'
Citation Removal oding Intention Acclimatization Acclimatization
Corte Suprema Removal Habitually N/A Bom in Canada; N/A
de Justicia de of 4-year- resident in lived exclusively
la Naci6n old Canada; in Canada until
[CSJN] daughter removal removal; attended
[Supreme by mother wrongful Canadian
Court of from kindergarten;
Justice], Canada to formed "bonds of
14/6/1995, Argentina affection" with
"Wilner, people, places, &
Eduardo Mario things
v. Osswald,
Maria Gabriela
/ recurso de
hecho,"
Colecci6n
Oficial de
Fallos de la
Corte Suprema
de Justicia de
la Naci6n
[Fallos] (1995-
318-1269)
(Arg.)
Johnson v. Retention Habitually N/A Born in N/A
Johnson; of 6-year- resident in Switzerland and
Regeringsritten old Sweden; lived there for
[RegR] daughter retention not about 2 years;
[Supreme by mother wrongful lived in the United
Administrative in Sweden States for 2 years
Court] 1996- alternating
05-09 (Swed.) between mother in
N.Y. and father in
Washington, D.C.;
lived in Sweden
for more than 2
years preceding
petition; by
agreement was to
spend total of 8
years in Sweden
and 4 years in the
United States
before turning 18
Rochford v. Removal Habitually N/A Born in England; N/A
Rochford, of 5-year- resident in lived exclusively
Juvenile Court old son by England; in England until
of Rome, 07 mother removal removal; spoke
jan. 1999, from wrongful only English (no
n.2450/98 E England to Italian)
(Italy) Italy I_ II
Notes & Observations
